

UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

Politics versus Policy: The Role of Northern Politics and Foreign Policy in the 2006
Conservative Election Campaign

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis will demonstrate that foreign policy played an unusually important role in Stephen Harper's 2006 campaign. Building from an unstable 2004 base, Harper and the new Conservative party needed a coalition of interests to encompass 4000 kilometres of right-of-centre beliefs, for a country as diverse as Canada. Harper and the Conservative party used a north-focused foreign policy to brand their party in the 2006 election, utilizing Arctic sovereignty issues, including military policy and stewardship of northern residents. Historically, Prime Minister Diefenbaker had used promises of northern economic opportunity to win the 1957 election, and Prime Minister Mulroney had used foreign policy promises to win the 1988 election, seeking free trade with the USA, but neither combined both.

This thesis contains four Conservative party source interviews, and multiple literature reviews, including one of an unpublished 2005 Conservative platform. This thesis analyses which promised Arctic projects were implemented after 2006, and if there is a strategy to the government's Arctic actions today. Facts and realities are considered, such as the 2006 expected five year defence budget being significantly more than what was received; and having the largest military power in the world directly south, representing more than 80% of Canada's export market. This thesis also examines if northern sovereignty can be expressed with non-military methods, and reviews what the government has implemented since its election. Lastly, this thesis assesses how the government is handling other northern sovereignty issues that have arisen since the election, such as proof of the Canadian continental plate location in the Arctic, with the due date for its research in 2013.

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DEDICATION

To all academics who have struggled balancing the goals of education with the realities
of illness

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1. Chart 4.1.2: National Defence Budget 2005 – 2018, Government of Canada (2010). Retrieved October 2010 from <http://www.budget.gc.ca/2010/plan/chap4a-eng.html#a6>, p. 85.

EPIGRAPH

It [the state] cannot part with the control of any vital function, the scale of its armament, the right to make war, its hold on colonies and spheres of influence, its power over tariffs, currency, migration, labour conditions, because to do so is to threaten, internally, the relations of production its sovereignty exists to maintain.

Harold J. Laski, *A Grammar of Politics* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1951), p. xxi.

INTRODUCTION: THESIS PURPOSE

The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that foreign policy played an unusually important role in Stephen Harper's 2006 Conservative campaign. This thesis will show that as part of the political evolution of domestic policy in campaigns, Stephen Harper and the Conservative party in the 2006 election used a provocative, north-focused foreign policy to brand their party, and subsequently won the election. Utilizing foreign policy to win a campaign had been done before, in 1988 by Brian Mulroney with an emphasis on free trade; however, it did not have a northern component. In 1957, John Diefenbaker was elected using a northern-based policy, yet this did not contain a foreign focus. This thesis will then examine the post-election implementation consequences of this strategy.

To prove this thesis, four interviews were conducted with inside Conservative party sources who played significant roles in the 2006 campaign, and who attest how Mr. Harper and the Conservative Party utilized a radical foreign policy to strengthen their voter support. Conservative interviewees include Ian Brodie, Chief of Staff at the Office of the Leader of the Opposition; an anonymous Conservative Party source; Patrick Muttart, public relations expert and Conservative advisor; and Bruce Carson, policy advisor to Stephen Harper. I also interviewed former Chief of Defence Staff General Rick Hillier. The documentation used in this thesis includes Conservative Party literature which follows a strategic progression from the election of 2004 to the election of 2006. One of these documents, the May 2005 platform, has never before been released to the public.

Literature already in existence examining the Canadian political evolution of domestic policy in campaigns includes *Leaders and Lesser Mortals: Backroom Politics*

in Canada, by John Laschinger and Geoffrey Stevens; *Fights of Our Lives* by John Duffy; and *The Canadian Federal Election of 2008*, by Jon H. Pammett and Christopher Dornan. John Duffy's book, *Fights of Our Lives*, covers almost the entire scope of Canadian political history, from 1867 to 1988. Duffy quotes George Hees' reference to a first "turning point,"¹ where the rules of national politics, in particular, national campaigns, changed completely. This point was when Diefenbaker, the underdog of the 1957 election, with "little to no chance of turfing the 'natural governing party' out of office,"² (the Liberal party which had been in power since 1926 with the exception of 1930-1935) won the election. Duffy explains that "before this election the leader and his image mattered; after 1957 they became paramount."³ Different as this might have been to the Liberal government, led by Louis St. Laurent, which Duffy describes as "Big Man. Big Ideas. Big Government," Diefenbaker's campaign did not focus on policy of any sort. It focused on Diefenbaker's human qualities: "intelligence, intensity, passion."⁴

Duffy continues analyzing the campaign and leadership strategy of Quebec native Pierre Trudeau, elected for a vision focused on modernity and progress. Policies of any kind were irrelevant to this election, as Trudeau's campaign was based on his rock-star image. "Canadians were enchanted by Trudeau's style more than his substance, 'the Mercedes sports car, the ascot ties and sandals. The racy reputation...'"⁵ In 1979, when Trudeau's term as prime minister came to a close, Joe Clark's winning campaign took

¹ John Duffy, *Fights of Our Lives: Elections, Leadership and the Making of Canada* (Toronto: HarperCollins Canada, 2002), p. 174.

² John Duffy, *Fights of Our Lives: Elections, Leadership and the Making of Canada* (Toronto: HarperCollins Canada, 2002), p. 174.

³ John Duffy, *Fights of Our Lives: Elections, Leadership and the Making of Canada* (Toronto: HarperCollins Canada, 2002), p.174.

⁴ John Duffy, *Fights of Our Lives: Elections, Leadership and the Making of Canada* (Toronto: HarperCollins Canada, 2002), p.194.

⁵ John Duffy, *Fights of Our Lives: Elections, Leadership and the Making of Canada* (Toronto: HarperCollins Canada, 2002), p. 243.

strength from his Conservative predecessor, Diefenbaker, focusing on his western support for hard work and populism. Domestic policy made an entrance as a campaign sales-feature, due to concerns of a Quebec referendum, and of the massive power appropriation to Ottawa that occurred in the Trudeau years. However, since globalization was yet to occur, foreign policy did not come into the campaign. In 1984, at the end of Trudeau's last government, a new Conservative leader entered the campaign race with an alternative election strategy. Like Trudeau, a Quebec native, Mulroney saw the opportunity to win over Liberal swing voters with Trudeau's demise. As Duffy explains, Mulroney ran a near-perfect campaign, against Liberal opposition John Turner's "dreadful one."⁶ As a Quebec native himself, up against a "member of the old regime,"⁷ Mulroney pulled off three winning plays, the middle of which concerned domestic policy: he gained support of the populist west by criticizing the Liberal government as corrupt, he offered Quebec a new constitutional settlement, and he crushed Turner in the televised debates.⁸ For all this, however, Mulroney's first campaign did not utilize foreign policy to win votes.

In the 1988 campaign, Duffy describes the changing face of the media: "The media made major scandals out of doings that, in earlier times, would have gone unnoticed."⁹ The era of the paparazzi had begun. Globalization had also begun, and international affairs were increasingly significant. Running a government that was struggling with scandal, Mulroney needed an issue on which to focus. The issue was free-trade with the USA. As Duffy explains,

⁶ John Duffy, *Fights of Our Lives: Elections, Leadership and the Making of Canada* (Toronto: HarperCollins Canada, 2002), p. 309.

⁷ John Duffy, *Fights of Our Lives: Elections, Leadership and the Making of Canada* (Toronto: HarperCollins Canada, 2002), p. 309.

⁸ John Duffy, *Fights of Our Lives: Elections, Leadership and the Making of Canada* (Toronto: HarperCollins Canada, 2002), p. 308.

⁹ John Duffy, *Fights of Our Lives: Elections, Leadership and the Making of Canada* (Toronto: HarperCollins Canada, 2002), p. 315.

In the PC Party's western heartland, free trade had been popular since Laurier's day as a counter to the power of central Canadian manufacturing and transport interests. It was also popular in many of the swing ridings of Ontario – the affluent constituencies of Toronto and down the 401 towards London. Last and most important for Mulroney, free trade sold well in his native province.

As the election proved, Mulroney was correct, winning him a second majority.

In *Leaders and Lesser Mortals*, published in 1992, authors Laschinger and Stevens examine the various paths to political power undertaken by federal contenders, and their secrets to success. The last such contender discussed is Brian Mulroney. Laschinger and Stevens make a sweeping statement at the beginning of the book concerning the role of policy, domestic or foreign, in winning an election:

Front-room politicians insist that their parties have policies on everything from agricultural subsidies to zinc processing, because they believe that the public expects and demands policy. The politicians are right and wrong. They are right to believe that Canadian voters expect political parties to have policies; most voters would think it decidedly odd if a party tried to fight an election without a platform. But they are wrong if they believe that voters decide how to cast their ballot on the basis of which party offers the most agreeable policies.¹⁰

¹⁰ John Laschinger and Geoffrey Stevens, *Leaders and Lesser Mortals: Backroom Politics in Canada* (Toronto: Key Porter Books Limited, 1992), p. 12.

Laschinger and Stevens assert here that neither domestic nor foreign policy election promises can swing voters to support a party. When they discuss Mulroney's 1988 campaign, after pointing out that Mulroney's Conservative government negotiated a free-trade agreement with the US in January of that year, an agreement that Mulroney's opposition, John Turner, angrily pointed out would "reduce us, I am sure, to a colony of the United States, because when the economic levers go, the political independence is sure to follow,"¹¹ they state that most observers and politicians would consider free trade the issue of the 1988 election. However, they also state that "only 31 percent of Canadians would admit to knowing anything at all about the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, [and] whether they knew anything about it or not, a majority did not like the agreement, according to polls established during the campaign."¹² Based on these polls, the book's initial sweeping statement is correct: Canadians were not using domestic or foreign policy to choose whom to vote for when this book was written. Another point made by Laschinger and Stevens, of interest to the role of policy in campaigns, is that "before declaring, a leadership candidate should commission a poll of party members and delegates to establish issues and strategy."¹³ This strategy makes sense if taken to mean that a leadership candidate must assess and consequently tackle issues that are of current concern to the public, but through means other than policy platforms; perhaps through the media. This could be considered the secret to success used by Brian Mulroney with Free Trade; it was not support for the policy in itself which won him the election, but rather

¹¹ John Laschinger and Geoffrey Stevens, *Leaders and Lesser Mortals: Backroom Politics in Canada* (Toronto: Key Porter Books Limited, 1992), p. 38.

¹² John Laschinger and Geoffrey Stevens, *Leaders and Lesser Mortals: Backroom Politics in Canada* (Toronto: Key Porter Books Limited, 1992), p. 13.

¹³ John Laschinger and Geoffrey Stevens, *Leaders and Lesser Mortals: Backroom Politics in Canada* (Toronto: Key Porter Books Limited, 1992), p. 211.

his usage of it in public speeches to garner localized support from the west, Ontario and Quebec, by proving his leadership capacity. Since the book was published in 1992, however, an analysis of Harper's continuation of this strategy, issuing foreign policy via media outlets rather than platforms to prove leadership capacity and unite the nation, is not provided.

The Canadian Federal Election of 2008, edited by Jon H. Pammett and Christopher Dornan analyses a campaign which occurred twenty years after the 1988 Mulroney campaign, and two years after Harper's Conservative government came to power. It also analyses the two years in between campaigns, in preparation for 2008. The book includes an examination of which 2006 campaign promises were and were not implemented under the Harper Conservative government in these two years. "The Conservatives, correctly assuming that their next campaign's narrative of strong leadership would have to be substantiated by a record of accomplishment, quickly moved to implement the central priorities from their 2006 campaign."¹⁴ This book analyses this implementation, referred to as incremental conservatism, and the problems that occurred. It describes "[the Prime Minister's] agenda being disrupted by a re-energized and more combative collection of opposition parties,"¹⁵ which were enabled by the minority Conservative government, and the Conservative government's consequential adoption of three perspectives on issues, including "issues that needed to be neutralized lest they damage the party in the next election."¹⁶ One issue categorized as such by Pammett and

¹⁴ Jon H. Pammett and Christopher Dornan, *The Canadian Federal Election of 2008* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2009), p. 17.

¹⁵ Jon H. Pammett and Christopher Dornan, *The Canadian Federal Election of 2008* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2009), p. 18.

¹⁶ Jon H. Pammett and Christopher Dornan, *The Canadian Federal Election of 2008* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2009), p. 26.

Dornan was Arctic affairs. Neutralization of the issue meant removing it from centre stage so it would not be of interest come the next election. Pammett and Dornan state that “[the Government] devoted considerable time and attention to establishing Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic”¹⁷ for the purpose of removing it from public interest in time for the 2008 election, though they do not provide an explanation on how this was, in their opinion, done. However, thanks to the global economic collapse in September of 2008, the Arctic issue was neutralized: The election became wholly about fiscal policy and stimulus packages; 2006’s issue of Arctic sovereignty was left behind. Successful implementation of 2006’s strategies to provide greater sovereignty in the Arctic for Canada was no longer of consequence, because more important concerns had come up and the public had lost interest.

Literature exists on northern Canada, and its political influence throughout various Canadian governments, including *Arctic Front: Defending Canada in the Far North* by Ken S. Coates et al, *Polar Imperative: A History of Arctic Sovereignty in North America* by Shelagh D. Grant, Mark Dickerson’s *Whose North: Political Change, Political Development, and Self-Government in the Northwest Territories*, and Michael Byer’s *Who Owns the Arctic? Understanding Sovereignty Disputes in the North*. *Arctic Front: Defending Canada in the Far North* is a detailed historical review of Arctic sovereignty, beginning in the fifteenth century with John Cabot’s trip to Labrador. Covering the historic progression with internal and international treaties, the book addresses sovereignty conflicts with native residents, various European powers, including Britain’s transfer of sovereignty over the Arctic islands in the 1880s, and the USA. The

¹⁷ Jon H. Pammett and Christopher Dornan, *The Canadian Federal Election of 2008* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2009), p. 34.

book moves into the twentieth century, offering a detailed review of the key Arctic events such as forming the DEW Line, including concerns about American encroachment into Canadian sovereignty. Prime Minister Diefenbaker is briefly mentioned, summarizing his northern vision in a single sentence: “John Diefenbaker campaigned in 1957 partly on his ‘northern vision,’ but this was based on exploiting the natural resources of the region rather than on military preparedness.”¹⁸ This succinctly summarizes the book’s dominant focus: military opportunities and threats for northern Canada.

The history of internal versus international waters is discussed in Chapter Three of *Arctic Front*, in “Internal Waters or International Strait? The Northwest Passage and the Cold War,” reaching the 1969 *Manhattan* incident. The book discusses the Mulroney years, with promises for northern defence initiatives including upgrading five northern airfields to accommodate CF-18 interceptor aircraft.¹⁹ More importantly, it describes the US agreement to ask Canadian consent before navigating icebreakers through what Canada considered internal waters, including the Northwest Passage.²⁰ Chapter Five, “The Final Race to the North Pole: Climate Change, Oil and Gas, and the New Battle for the Arctic,” moves into the Harper era, setting the scene with negative realities such as Russian submarines floating around Arctic waters, proving where continental shelves end in the Arctic, and issues of climate change. Next, the chapter addresses positive opportunities, including shortening sea travel by huge distances by utilizing the Northwest Passage instead of the Panama Canal, and as yet relatively unexplored

¹⁸ Ken Coates et al, *Arctic Front: Defending Canada in the Far North* (Toronto: Thomas Allan Publishers, 2008), p. 76.

¹⁹ Ken Coates et al, *Arctic Front: Defending Canada in the Far North* (Toronto: Thomas Allan Publishers, 2008), p. 121.

²⁰ Ken Coates et al, *Arctic Front: Defending Canada in the Far North* (Toronto: Thomas Allan Publishers, 2008), p. 122.

profitable northern resources such as oil, and their impacts on Canada politically, environmentally and financially.

Current defence issues are examined in Chapter Five, including Russia's actions in 2007 of planting a Russian flag on the sea floor of the North Pole. Canada's due date of 2013 to deliver to the UN proof of where the Canadian continental shelf ends is described, along with current concerns as to Canada's tiny military presence in the Far North, and the fact that "policy and investments have, so far, lagged behind the rhetoric."²¹ Offering detailed descriptions of the history of Arctic events, including policy implementation by the current Conservative government from its election in 2006 until the book's date of publication in 2008, what Coates et al's book does not cover is the details of Harper's campaigns, details of his promises regarding the north, that these northern promises were central to his election in 2006, and their influence on the bigger scope of Canadian politics.

Polar Imperative: A history of Arctic sovereignty in North America by Shelagh D. Grant, like *Arctic Front*, spends the first seven chapters setting the historical stage, going as far back as 3000 BC with the Arctic's first inhabitants. Chapter Eight, The Twentieth Century, begins with "Perfecting Sovereign Titles" between 1900 and 1938, giving background on nations with Arctic claims including Norway, Denmark, Russia and the USA. This is followed by World War II and Cold War histories, in particular, the pioneering in US military development of the Arctic, development in the 1950s of Russian research stations, and the lack of similar development by Canada.

Chronologically explaining the important defence creations of the Mid Canada, Pine Tree

²¹ Ken Coates et al, *Arctic Front: Defending Canada in the Far North* (Toronto: Thomas Allan Publishers, 2008), p. 169.

and Dew Lines, Chapter 10 ends in 1960 with the recognition that the Canada/US Arctic sovereignty issues are complex and historical, as the nations try to balance the massive US economic power with strong Canadian sensitivities regarding “perceived intrusions on their sovereign rights.”²²

Chapter 11 takes the reader from the 1960s through to 2004, following the discovery of Arctic oil and the development of Aboriginal rights. Grant discusses UNCLOS III (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) 1, the categories for offshore waters, and the beginnings of continental shelf definitions. The actions of various Prime Ministers on the north are discussed, including a brief description of Diefenbaker’s plans for northern developments, and later, of Mulroney’s Polar Sea prompt to draw baselines around the Arctic Archipelago and consequently declare the passage as an internal waterway. Moving towards the 21st century, this chapter concludes with information on what various Arctic-concerned groups, such as the Arctic Council, the International Arctic Science Committee, the G7 and the Inuit Circumpolar Council have and have not done for Aboriginal rights and environmental issues, with studies like the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment and protocols such as Kyoto.

Chapter 12, “Beginning of a New Era,” concerns itself with the last decade. Firstly, it discusses the lack of action by both Canada and the US towards a key Arctic issue of global warming. Secondly, the chapter addresses the changes in government amongst Inuit, with their progression towards self-government, and the impact this will have on ownership of northern resources in the future. Grant discusses how media is tackling the Harper government’s recent Arctic activities, and takes the view that its

²² Shelagh Grant, *Polar Imperative: A history of Arctic sovereignty in North America* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2010), p. 338.

strategy is flawed. She quotes the title of Paul Wells' *Maclean's* magazine article; "The Cold Truth: Why Harper's Tough Talk on Arctic Sovereignty Is Empty," describing the failure of the single-hulled HMCS Toronto to float in the ice of the Davis Strait, unable to carry out planned manoeuvres due to being single-hulled.²³

In the last chapter of Grant's book, entitled "Conflicts and Challenges," she addresses the current situation in the Arctic for the various Arctic nations, including Canada. Critical of the Harper government's lack of action in the north, Grant acknowledges realities of a minority government in a recession. In an amazingly detailed analysis of the history of the Arctic from the origin of human life there, Grant addresses history, party policies, and government action. Like *Arctic Front*, what she does not address is the usage of the Arctic within campaigns, and implications thereof from the perspective of the party, specifically the Conservatives and Stephen Harper post 2006. The perspective she takes is of the Arctic itself, and its residents. An amazing resource for detailed information, the book does not address campaign politics.

Michael Byers' book, *Who Owns the Arctic? Understanding Sovereignty Disputes in the North* spans the last century in detail. With a brief introduction on the history of Arctic sovereignty, Chapter Two, entitled "Who Owns Hans Island?," brings up the conflict between Denmark and Canada over this little island for the sake of concerns by Canadians, quoting Dr. Rob Huebert, that the dispute would "have implications for Canada's interests in the Northwest Passage and the Beaufort Sea,"²⁴ yet concludes that this is a wrong conclusion and due to its location thousands of kilometers

²³ Shelagh Grant, *Polar Imperative: A history of Arctic sovereignty in North America* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2010), p. 430.

²⁴ Michael Byers, *Who Owns the Arctic? Understanding Sovereignty Disputes in the North* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2009), p.28.

from the Northwest Passage and thousands of kilometers from the Beaufort Sea, it would have little impact on ownership of these waterways.²⁵ Next, Byers addresses the future of the northern waterways, and what he refers to as “the big melt.”²⁶ Discussing mineral resources, legal rights, and access to them, Byers reviews Canada’s Arctic ownership definition, of drawing straight base lines around its Arctic islands to claim all waterways within, and describes the United States’ interpretation, through the 1988 Arctic Cooperation Agreement, finding no validity to this claim.²⁷

Moving into modern issues, Chapter Four, “The Northwest Passage in Contemporary Policy” reviews genuine threats to North America via transit on the Northwest Passage, and the risks of Canada and the USA not working together. Byers reviews Harper’s actions in the north since election, in particular, the issuance of promises which have generally not been fulfilled, regarding military security. He describes military vehicles such as the old and slow Twin Otters, responsible for Arctic search and rescue. The exception, according to Byers, is the satellite Radarsat 2, though it was dominantly funded by the Liberal government of Chrétien.²⁸ Byers progresses into current negotiations over the Northwest Passage, including issues of foreign submarines travelling undetected through the water. He acknowledges that US interests are changing, with Russian access no longer being the concern, but rather, terrorists entering North America via the passage. Since the Russian waterway, the Northern Sea Route, is

²⁵ Michael Byers, *Who Owns the Arctic? Understanding Sovereignty Disputes in the North* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2009), p.28.

²⁶ Michael Byers, *Who Owns the Arctic? Understanding Sovereignty Disputes in the North* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2009), p.38.

²⁷ Michael Byers, *Who Owns the Arctic? Understanding Sovereignty Disputes in the North* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2009), pp. 57-58.

²⁸ Michael Byers, *Who Owns the Arctic? Understanding Sovereignty Disputes in the North* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2009), p.66.

internal, if the Northwest Passage is international, it will be the one to provide terrorist access.

Byers moves into resource ownership in Chapter Six, and follows this with a chapter entitled “Sovereignty and the Inuit,” since, as with Grant, he recognizes that native sovereignty is growing, and this will have a huge impact on Canadian ownership of resources in Arctic land and water. His conclusion, entitled “An Arctic for Everyone,” acknowledges the crisis the Arctic is in, what with the issues of climate change, internal ownership, external ownership, and the historic muddle that has been created. As with the works of Grant and Coates et al, Byers addresses events and policies implemented (or not implemented) in the Arctic, but does not address campaign Arctic goals, and the larger scale political impacts of the accomplishment or failure of these goals to be enacted.

The book *Whose North: Political Change, Political Development, and Self-Government in the Northwest Territories* is an excellent one-century review of Arctic affairs, in particular, focusing on the modern day, but takes the perspective of the Arctic, not the government, and does not address issues from the view of Mr. Harper and the Conservative party. *Whose North*, by Mark Dickerson, analyses the internal dynamics in the Northwest Territories of residents, culture, land claims, health issues, self-government and resource-revenue-sharing agreements. He breaks the chapters up chronologically, entering the time of Diefenbaker in Chapter Five, “Changing the Political Process of the Northwest Territories, 1967-79.” The biggest historical event Dickerson mentions in this time period is the movement of the government of the Northwest Territories from Ottawa to Yellowknife. Though the territorial government was still alien to the residents, “it

became a major player in setting the political agenda for the region.”²⁹ It also precipitated another key event, which would later impact Harper and the Conservatives: Native residents, the Dene, Inuit, Inuvialuit, and Métis, began forming political organizations which would become major players politically, not always in accord with each other, and with their own political agendas.³⁰ In the last chapter of the book, *Self-Government and Political Development in the Northwest Territories*, Dickerson evaluates the progress towards self-government in the Northwest Territories, describing where things stood upon completion of the book in 1992. He states that while self-government is a crucial goal, “the idea is linked intricately with other goals: land claim settlements, cultural preservation, and economic development.”³¹ Dickerson’s conclusions are that if the development of a centralized territorial government precedes the development of local and regional governments, continued devolution will be difficult. If these centralized governments make decisions affecting land claims, culture, and economics, then locals will generally resent them. Lastly, if different cultural groups influence the development of an institutionalized political process, then their values will be represented.³²

Though not directly related to the thesis in terms of content, Dickerson’s work provides an important overview of the difficulties facing Harper and the Conservatives today regarding continued devolution of power in the Northwest Territories, and shows

²⁹ Mark Dickerson, *Whose North? Political Change, Political Development, and Self-Government in the Northwest Territories* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1992), p. 114.

³⁰ Mark Dickerson, *Whose North? Political Change, Political Development, and Self-Government in the Northwest Territories* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1992), p. 114.

³¹ Mark Dickerson, *Whose North? Political Change, Political Development, and Self-Government in the Northwest Territories* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1992), p. 169.

³² Mark Dickerson, *Whose North? Political Change, Political Development, and Self-Government in the Northwest Territories* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1992), p. 189.

that the government's social, economic and political success at implementing campaign promises have been and will continue to be challenged by this state of affairs.

This thesis covers a political time period not covered by John Laschinger, Geoffrey Stevens, Jon H. Pammett, Christopher Dornan and John Duffy regarding Canadian elections, and campaign detail not addressed by Ken Coates et al, Shelagh Grant, Mark Dickerson and Michael Byers. It demonstrates how Stephen Harper's and the Conservative Party's foreign and domestic policy concerning Arctic sovereignty released in the 2006 campaign, including ownership of the Northwest Passage and Arctic Archipelago, mineral rights there-under, and stewardship of northern residents were critical in the Conservative party's win of the 2006 Canadian election.

CHAPTER 1: A BRIEF BACKGROUND ON CONSERVATIVE NORTHERN POLITICS AND POLICY

INTRODUCTION

Stephen Harper's Conservative predecessors, John Diefenbaker and Brian Mulroney, utilized northern affairs to nourish public support at opposite ends of the political process. Diefenbaker favoured focusing on the Canadian north while campaigning, with a vision of economic hope and opportunity. Mulroney preferred using the north once elected, through policies aimed at finding tangible methods to improve sovereignty. The public support each achieved through their northern strategies included personal-level relationships with key people such as ministers, alliances (both domestic and foreign) and interest groups within the mass public.³³ This network is collectively referred to as a coalition. Coalitions represent any instance of "the joining of forces by two or more parties during a conflict of interest with other parties,"³⁴ the relevant conflict of interest being who is governing the nation.

Diefenbaker, in power from 1957 to 1963, utilized his northern campaign rhetoric to help build a coalition empowered by the large interest group of financially needy Canadians, based on promises of northern economic opportunities that his government could offer if elected. Over twenty years later, Mulroney, Prime Minister from 1984 to 1993, chose not to use northern opportunities when campaigning, but rather, foreign policy, seeking free trade with the USA as a medium to strengthen the Canadian alliance with the United States and consequently stabilize Canadian sovereignty. This chapter will examine these two Prime Ministers' alternatives in

³³ Mark Dickerson and Thomas Flanagan, *An Introduction to Government and Politics: A Conceptual Approach*, Seventh Edition (Toronto: Nelson, 2006), p. 11.

³⁴ Alexander H. Harcourt and Frans B. M. De Waal, eds., *Coalitions and Alliances in Humans and Other Animals* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 3, cited in Mark Dickerson and Thomas Flanagan, *An Introduction to Government and Politics: A Conceptual Approach*; Seventh Edition (Toronto: Nelson, 2006), p. 11.

northern strategies, by which Canadian coalitions can be united, so that the northern strategy of Prime Minister Harper can comparatively be evaluated.

DIEFENBAKER – THE ART OF POLITICS

Campaigning is the mobilization of the public interest engine, through abstract visions and ideals, and concrete statistics and realities. In 1957, Louis St. Laurent's Liberals severely overestimated their popularity, riding on historical assumptions of public faith in their decisions. Lacking even an advisory committee (their Advisory Council met only once between 1953 and 1957),³⁵ they were blissfully ignorant of growing public resentment towards policies like their pipeline bill, for which they imposed closure on Parliament four times to pass.³⁶ John G. Diefenbaker, nominated leader of the Progressive Conservatives in December of 1956, foresaw that a vision for the north could mobilize his campaign, through an abstract opportunity. The abstract vision challenged Canada's lack of a "transcending sense of national purpose"³⁷ with a "New Frontier Policy," "the north in place of the west."³⁸ The New Frontier Policy was created by Merryl Menzies, who was Diefenbaker's chief economic advisor. It encompassed ideas of hydro and mining projects, a new province in southern Yukon (in southern Mackenzie Valley) for increasing development, public and private sector financing to initiate new communities, and promotion of local industries like fishing, forestry and agriculture. The policy also included the development of railways, northern highways, high-rises and dams.³⁹ The new vision offered

³⁵ Murray Beck, *Pendulum of Power* (Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 292.

³⁶ In 1956 the Liberal government financed construction of a cross country gas pipeline against parliamentary and public support.

³⁷ John Duffy, *Fights of our Lives: Elections, Leadership, and the Making of Canada* (Toronto: Harper Collins, 2002), p. 196.

³⁸ John Duffy, *Fights of our Lives: Elections, Leadership, and the Making of Canada* (Toronto: Harper Collins, 2002), p.197.

³⁹ John Duffy, *Fights of our Lives: Elections, Leadership, and the Making of Canada* (Toronto: Harper Collins, 2002), p..197.

prospects for all Canadians. It “allow(ed) a vital bond to form between politician and voter... as a conscious attempt to renew the frontier spirit that had built the Canadian Pacific Railway and settled the west.”⁴⁰

Recognizing that times were changing, Diefenbaker searched for new concrete campaign strategies. Prior to the war Ministers were chosen based on their regional appeal, but local causes were losing public interest in favour of bigger and more national concepts. Diefenbaker accessed the spirit of the rural nation by broadening the Conservative “Anglomaniac identity”⁴¹ in an energetic campaign. He used new media such as public television (in particular, CBC) and imaginative campaign brochures. Entitled “A New National Policy,” his brochure put emphasis on northern potential, “the North - with its vast resources and hidden wealth - the wonder and challenge of the North must become our national consciousness. All that is needed, as I see it today, is an imaginative policy that will open its doors to Canadian initiative and enterprise.”⁴²

Diefenbaker’s campaign emphasized economic opportunity. The Maritimes and west were suffering financially in the 1950s. Pensions were low and the Liberal campaign offered insubstantial increases. Maritime miners and prairie farmers were paid the same as they were 15 years previously. Diefenbaker brought in wheat price protection, government subventions, and above all, a system of flexible support prices for agricultural commodities. Pensions would see more than the Liberal “20 cent a day measure.”⁴³ Though these aspects did not involve the north, they demonstrated Diefenbaker’s understanding of popular psychology, that Canadians

⁴⁰ John Duffy, *Fights of our Lives: Elections, Leadership, and the Making of Canada* (Toronto: Harper Collins, 2002), p. 197-198.

⁴¹ Murray Beck, *Pendulum of Power* (Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 306.

⁴² John Duffy, *Fights of our Lives: Elections, Leadership, and the Making of Canada* (Toronto: Harper Collins, 2002), p. 202.

⁴³ Murray Beck, *Pendulum of Power* (Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 297.

desired a leader who understood the realities of life, and would make changes to improve economic conditions.

Elected as Prime Minister in June of 1957 with a minority government, Diefenbaker's first term was short. The Liberal party was reeling from the shock of losing and the nation was increasingly excited about Menzies' vision. A Cabinet would hardly be formed when the next election was triggered (seven months later) by Lester Pearson, St. Laurent's successor. The few policies initiated in Diefenbaker's first term were based on pro-welfare campaign promises, such as increased pensions for the aged, blind and disabled, and support prices for a number of agricultural products, not the northern vision. Instead of building or buying nuclear powered subs or icebreakers to patrol the north, the Royal Canadian Navy's resources were transferred to NATO's anti-sub operations in Diefenbaker's first term, sending the HMCS Labrador to the department of transportation in 1958 and releasing 200 men for duty on "fighting ships" with NATO.⁴⁴ This was ironic considering all the campaign pomp and hype of the New Frontier Policy.

The NATO resource transfer demonstrated international politics at the expense of northern policy, reflecting a political assessment by Diefenbaker of what the public really desired from the Prime Minister. The Canada-US relationship would also be significant to northern policy. Norad had been formed in the summer of 1957 (a result of Liberal politics), which included finishing the DEW Line. Though concerned about the bilateral balance of power, Diefenbaker was also concerned about unilateral power in the north. He decided to take advantage of US DEW Line cooperation, however, to simultaneously increase Arctic sovereignty and security, while providing some Aboriginal integration through provision of employment

⁴⁴ Leeming, *HMS Labraor and the Canadian Arctic* (Vancouver, UBC Press, 1982, p. 306-7.

under the Royal Canadian Air Force in 1959.⁴⁵ Both were popular actions. The concept of water sovereignty was just beginning, and in 1958 at UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea), the notion of giving sovereign rights to the ocean floor was proposed.⁴⁶ This would take many more generations to become policy, but was politically strategic for showing the publically visible concrete actions in the north. Upon the 1958 election, too little time had passed for the public to expect many results from the New Frontier Policy.

Diefenbaker's 1958 campaign required political integration of the preceding term's campaign promises, policies issued, feedback, needs of the new policy community, and realities of 1958. One significant pressure group had been missed in the first election, Quebec voters. Less inspired by Diefenbaker's northern vision due to its' relevance to the financially struggling Maritimes and western Canada, they were brought on board through befriending Maurice Duplessis, Premier of Quebec, and the support of the Union Nationale. When Diefenbaker stated "[it is] the responsibility of any Canadian Government to open these doors of boundless opportunity so that our people may go in and possess their own great storehouse of wealth abundant...,"⁴⁷ "our people" now included Quebec, winning Diefenbaker a majority government in 1958.

Northern Policies developed from the 1958 campaign were a continuation of the promises of the 1957 campaign, with the addition of Quebec's northern interests within the policy community. The critical need was to find ways to turn the initial vision into something tangible. Diefenbaker initiated the Roads to Resources program, for the purpose of stimulating the

⁴⁵ Ken Coates et al, *Arctic Front: Defending Canada in the Far North* (Toronto: Thomas Allan Publishers, 2008), p. 75.

⁴⁶ UNEP/GRID-Arendal (2009), *Background to UNCLOS*. Retrieved May 13, 2010: <http://www.continentalshelf.org/about/1143.aspx>.

⁴⁷ CBC TV network from Quebec (Saskatoon, Diefenbaker Centre Archives, Thursday March 27, 1958), MG 01/VI 304 - 1958.4 Government - Elections - 1958 - Speeches 1958, Volume 95, Reel M-7831, 081834.

northern economy by developing access roads (such as the Mackenzie and Dempster Highways,)⁴⁸ bridges, buildings and ultimately strengthening industries of oil, gas, mineral extraction, forestry and fishing in the Yukon and Northwest Territories. Northern private development was also encouraged by increasing royalties to Canadians. The Bill of Rights was established in 1960. The Inuit had been given the vote in 1954 but access to voting stations in the central or eastern Arctic was difficult.⁴⁹ Now, new polling stations were established and Indians were also given voting rights. This aspect of northern policy had little concrete effect on the vast majority of the policy community, but it did generate political support as equality and rights became⁴⁹ popular topics. For similar reasons, Diefenbaker appointed the first Aboriginal Minister, Leonard Marchand. Norad continued its overseeing of the north in the interests of protecting the Americas from the Soviets.

A significant consequence of the Roads to Resources program that began to emerge as the 1962 election was called was negative public feedback at the resulting deficit. The program itself cost over \$3 million for the first year alone.⁵⁰ The New Frontier Policy was presented in 1957 to the Canadian farmer and miner as an extractive source for distribution elsewhere, not as a distributive centre using taxes extracted further south. Though Diefenbaker was continuing to push northern opportunities, such as with statistics to the PC Association of Montreal in 1959 concerning easier access for oil and gas developments, explorations of the continental shelf and Arctic islands, and the fact that 68.7% of the developments were by Canadian corporations and

⁴⁸ Coates et al, *Arctic Front: Defending Canada in the Far North* (Toronto: Thomas Allen Publishers, 2008) p. 87.

⁴⁹ Mark Dickerson, *Whose North? Political Change, Political Development, and Self-Government in the Northwest Territories* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1992), p. 70.

⁵⁰ John Diefenbaker, *One Canada: Memoirs of the Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker; The Tumultuous Years: 1962-1967* (Toronto, MacMillan, 1972), p. 283.

individuals,⁵¹ the average Canadian he campaigned towards in 1957 was experiencing serious unemployment and mounting public debt. An economic upswing had begun in the second quarter of 1961, but the concept of Canadian sustained development of northern resources was proving to be merely a dream.

The 1962 campaign reduced Diefenbaker's government to a minority. Though Roads to Resources did implement some of what was initially (vaguely) alluded to, the northern vision remained just that - an abstract vision. Diefenbaker outlined a 16-point prosperity plan as the second stage of the national prosperity plan for the coming five years; but as with the New Frontier Policy, it lacked financial substance, resorting to oversimplification and avoiding details such as how to actually utilize the north to improve the lives of Canadians.⁵²

Northern policy focus dissipated with southern policy realities. Six days after the election, "to relieve the pressure on the Canadian dollar and to strengthen Canada's badly depleted exchange reserves, there were to be temporary tariff surcharges on about half the country's imports, substantial cuts in government expenditures, and the imposition of a tight-money policy."⁵³ Northern policy aspirations like Roads to Resources could not be funded when Canada was borrowing from the IMF and Great Britain.

In 1963, Pearson announced that Canada should accept nuclear warheads (which was a reversal of his previous position), largely in response to General Norstad's⁵⁴ statement that Canada had already committed to a nuclear role.⁵⁵ The *Toronto Star* discussed Diefenbaker's failure to create a strong Canadian Coast Guard, acquire nuclear submarines, invest in more

⁵¹ PC Association of Montreal Public Address, (Saskatoon, Diefenbaker Centre Archives, May 8, 1959), Reel M-8186, 178722.

⁵² Murray Beck, *Pendulum of Power* (Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 334-336.

⁵³ Murray Beck, *Pendulum of Power* (Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 351.

⁵⁴ Retiring Supreme Commander of NATO.

⁵⁵ Murray Beck, *Pendulum of Power* (Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 352.

nuclear icebreakers and build Canadian nuclear weaponry to be used at Canadian discretion.⁵⁶ The DEW Line had lost significance to the superior Ballistic Missile Early Warning System, BMEWS,⁵⁷ and northern mining and gas explorations were actually on the decline.⁵⁸ Besides investment into Roads to Resources, Diefenbaker's artful northern political abstraction did not include much concrete policy, and art can only take a nation so far.

MULRONEY: THE ACT OF POLICY

Liberal leader Pierre Trudeau resigned in 1984 leaving his successor, John Turner, with a difficult situation. Thanks to a global recession in 1981, oil prices had collapsed, the National Energy Programme (which caused massive western alienation) wasn't financing Ottawa as expected, unemployment was skyrocketing and the federal deficit was soaring. Lacking a vision for the future with which to power the public interest engine, unable to generate faith due to the financial situation, and lacking a charismatic leader, the Liberals had little to ride on in 1984.

When his nemesis, Joe Clark asked for a Conservative leadership race voluntarily after receiving only 66% support in 1982,⁵⁹ Brian Mulroney seized an opportunity, as a Conservative Quebecker, to become leader of the Conservative opposition. Unlike Diefenbaker, Brian Mulroney's 1984 campaign did not utilize a northern opportunities strategy, but rather mobilized a coalition of interests between Quebec and the western Provinces via a unifying desire for decentralization of power. Describing the "Big Ottawa" style Liberals as corrupt, pulling off a

⁵⁶ Memorandum for: The Prime Minister. Prime Minister's Election promises and Appraisal by the Toronto Star. (Saskatoon, Diefenbaker Centre Archives, 1968), M-8186, 178979.

⁵⁷ Bob Plamondon, *Blue Thunder: The Truth about Conservatives from MacDonal to Harper* (Toronto: Key Porter, 2009), p. 235-236.

⁵⁸ Bob Plamondon, *Blue Thunder: The Truth about Conservatives from MacDonal to Harper* (Toronto: Key Porter, 2009), p. 245.

⁵⁹ Bob Plamondon, *Blue Thunder: The Truth about Conservatives from MacDonal to Harper* (Toronto: Key Porter, 2009), p. 310.

“Quebec Bridge” with a new constitutional settlement, and calling Turner to account for his “patronage appointments”⁶⁰ was more than enough to stimulate public support.

After a landslide victory in September 1984, winning 211 of 282 seats, Mulroney was ready to utilize northern policy for one key Conservative political vision, improving public perception of national economic stability. Mulroney turned foreign investment around, repealing the Liberals’ Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax and eradicating the National Energy Programme.⁶¹ He continued by replacing FIRA (Foreign Investment Review Agency) with Investment Canada to bring in more foreign dollars, and initiated the Capital Gains Exemption, a \$500,000 tax free benefit to inspire new investors.⁶² Though there were not exclusively northern policies, several northern stakeholders supported these moves. They included oil and gas corporations who wanted to explore and develop the north without being taxed into withdrawal, the Territorial governments who desired financial independence from the privatization of industry⁶³ and the federal government itself who desired to decrease the budget drain from the Territories. The positive budget impact also had the capacity to be marketed to stimulate support from what would otherwise continue to be a generally disinterested public. These actions were part of what Northern Affairs Minister Bill McKnight would publish prior to the next election campaign in the *Northern Political and Economic Framework*, explaining Federal commitment to the long term strategy they called “devolution,” regarding the Federal role in land ownership,

⁶⁰ John Duffy, *Fights of our Lives: Elections, Leadership, and the Making of Canada* (Toronto: Harper Collins, 2002), p. 309-313.

⁶¹ Mark Dickerson, *Whose North? Political Change, Political Development, and Self-Government in the Northwest Territories* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1992), p. 331.

⁶² Bob Plamondon, *Blue Thunder: The Truth about Conservatives from MacDonalld to Harper* (Toronto: Key Porter, 2009), p. 332.

⁶³ Bob Plamondon, *Blue Thunder: The Truth about Conservatives from MacDonalld to Harper* (Toronto: Key Porter, 2009), p. 332.

territorial government rights, cooperation on development and safeguarding northern sovereignty.⁶⁴

In 1985, the “Polar Sea problem” occurred, when the US Coast Guard sent its Polar Sea icebreaker up to the US base on Greenland only to have winter prevent its return, unless it used the Northwest Passage. Mulroney declared the Passage to be internal water, but allowed the ship passage under AWPPA (Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act) requirements. He and President Reagan subsequently created the Arctic Cooperation Agreement, which resolved the practical issue without resolving the sovereignty issue. Under the already existing Law of the Sea, ships engaged in transit of the passage were not permitted to engage in research. The agreement stated that all US Coast Guard icebreakers are engaged in research, hence requiring the permission of the government of Canada to pass through. This permission was guaranteed. In 1986, Under Joe Clark, Minister of External Affairs, Canada defined its northern borders using straight “baselines”⁶⁵ of longitude to enclose the entire Arctic Archipelago, including the Passage.⁶⁶

Much of the policy community, including the media, the Liberals, and the Council for Canadians, considered this an affront to sovereignty. Mulroney responded with a review of Canadian Arctic sovereignty, informing the US that all Arctic waters required navigation permission. The US agreed to seek Canadian consent to travel, on the basis that these were “scientific missions of mutual benefit to both countries.”⁶⁷ By explicitly avoiding defining a policy regarding US need for Canadian approval to travel in Arctic internal waters in further

⁶⁴ Raymond Blake, *Transforming the Nation: Canada and Brian Mulroney* (Ontario: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007), p. 348.

⁶⁵ Baselines were straight longitudinal lines drawn from the easternmost and westernmost point of Canada’s border with the US, meeting at the north pole to ascertain Canadian Arctic territory.

⁶⁶ Raymond Blake, *Transforming the Nation: Canada and Brian Mulroney* (Ontario: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007), p. 347.

⁶⁷ Coates et al, *Arctic Front: Defending Canada in the Far North* (Toronto: Thomas Allen Publishers, 2008) pp. 116-122.

detail, Mulroney prevented the US from needing to respond with a concrete definition of its own legal position regarding Arctic water ownership in the interests of its own Arctic security, and thus forcing Canada into submission. Probably few members of the public realized what was truly at stake, because few like to acknowledge Canada's Arctic impotence when in conflict with the largest economy in the world. This issue aggravated public desire for Canadian capacity to defend its own waters by way of nuclear submarines and icebreakers, but this vision, suggested in the 1987 Defence White Paper,⁶⁸ couldn't materialize into policy due to Mulroney's recognition that, popular with the less informed public or not, worthwhile results could not warrant the necessary volume of spending. Balancing the budget weighed more significantly in Mulroney's northern strategy than debatably insignificant concrete northern protection.

Though Canada did not participate in "Star Wars,"⁶⁹ to prove to the public that actions for Arctic Sovereignty were being taken, Mulroney helped respond to the new air-launched cruise missile threat through the North American Aid Defence Modernization Programme by updating the DEW Line. Canada supplied 40% coverage of construction and maintenance costs to the "North Warning System,"⁷⁰ emphasizing that it was as much Canada's policy as America's. Updating of the DEW Line was bolstered by re-initiation of army exercises in the Arctic, NORPAT flights and NORPLOY naval deployments, which had all discontinued in the 1970s. Mulroney also issued the 1987 Defence policy with three polar projection maps allocating substantial resources towards security such as maritime patrol aircraft, a northern training centre

⁶⁸ Peter Newman, *The Secret Mulroney Tapes: Unguarded Confessions of a Prime Minister* (USA, Random House, 2005), p. 5.

⁶⁹ A US satellite protection system against the Kola Peninsula Soviet Ballistic Missile submarine fleet.

⁷⁰ Coates et al, *Arctic Front: Defending Canada in the Far North* (Toronto: Thomas Allen Publishers, 2008) p. 124.

and upgrading of five airfields to accommodate CF-18s.⁷¹ Most of these items would later be removed from Defence policy with budget cutbacks, but this occurred after the next election.

Mulroney's initial goal in his first term in office had been finding creative ways to clean up the financial mess left by Trudeau (a debt of over \$190 billion, up from \$19 billion upon entering office 16 years before).⁷² In Mulroney's first term, even with a \$7B operating surplus, the debt still shot from \$194B to \$314B due to high interest rates,⁷³ and with multiple scandals, PC support fell to record lows at around 20% pre-election.⁷⁴ The answer to improving this lay with the traditional Mulroney campaign feature, economic security, by an improved decentralization plan. Having picked up on the lingering public dissatisfaction from the Quebec referendum of 1980, over his first term Mulroney and his advisors began consolidating a multifaceted and multicultural vision to reunite not only his coalition, but also the majority government itself. It emphasized empowerment of Quebec via economic independence but continued sovereign union with Canada (the Meech Lake Accord), and a balancing empowerment of the west via free trade to further provincial economic decentralization from Ottawa (Free Trade with the USA). The north was, again, not a focus of the 1988 Mulroney campaign. The campaign focus of Meech Lake stimulated northerners' frustrations over the Territories' lack of right to participate in Constitutional amendments, and questioning why Quebec (with a culture relatively similar to the rest of the nation) should deserve a distinct cultural recognition, when First Nations should not be offered the same. The southern-focused Free Trade plan did nothing to alleviate this. The campaign core issues were still brilliant,

⁷¹ Coates et al, *Arctic Front: Defending Canada in the Far North* (Toronto: Thomas Allen Publishers, 2008) pp. 120-121.

⁷² Kenneth McDonald, *The Revolution from Above*, Retrieved May 13, 2010 from http://www.dialogue.ca/APRIL-MAY%2004%2017.6/revolution_from_above.htm.

⁷³ Bob Plamondon, *Full Circle: Death and Resurrection in Canadian Conservative Politics* (Toronto: Key Porter 2006), p. 338.

⁷⁴ Paul Newman, *The Secret Mulroney Tapes: Unguarded Confessions of a Prime Minister* (Toronto: Random House, 2005), p. 148.

however, because though they stimulated some general resentment in the small and isolated interest groups of Territorial residents, they had much greater impact fracturing the Liberals into disarray. Turner had instructed the mostly Liberal Senate to block Free Trade until after the election, so it became the heart of the campaign. In November 1988, an Environics poll showed the Liberals at 37% support and the PCs at 31%, enough for a Liberal minority. World capital markets promptly liquidated their Canadian assets, proving international dissatisfaction with the concept of a Liberal government in charge of Canadian finances, and with Liberal opposition to free trade. Corporate Canada provided support to the Conservatives with advertisements, letters of support and financial provision. This caused the dollar to fall badly.⁷⁵ Mulroney had proved his point. Even without a northern mobilization feature, he won the election with another majority.

Mulroney's second term represented the advent of the Post Cold War era. In 1989 with the collapse of the Soviet Union, further expansion of northern military outposts and security operations seemed obsolete. New issues were increasingly domestic, such as northern aboriginal land claims and rights to self government. Mulroney supported the agreement with the Council for Yukon Indians, called the Umbrella Agreement, in 1988, which dealt with land claims, compensation monies, self government, and the establishment of boards, committees and tribunals to ensure successful joint management,⁷⁶ items stimulated by the Meech Lake pre-campaign and campaign focus. Tom Siddon, Mulroney's fourth and most influential Northern Affairs Minister, is largely credited with the success of the Nunavut Agreement with the Tunngavik Federation of Nunavut, who represented the Inuit in eastern Northwest Territories, on

⁷⁵ John Duffy, *Fights of our Lives: Elections, Leadership, and the Making of Canada* (Toronto: Harper Collins, 2002), p. 351.

⁷⁶ Council of Yukon First Nations (2010), *Umbrella Final Agreement*. Downloaded May 13, 2010 from <http://www.cyfn.ca/ouragreementsufa?noCache=375:1273784661>.

which creation of the territory in 1999 was based. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Siddon formed a transitional, tactical plan to introduce legislation to Parliament to create the territorial government, including making political arrangements to transfer jurisdiction on subjects similar to the Umbrella Agreement: land use planning, property taxation, natural resource planning and wildlife management.⁷⁷ In a time of recession and budget slashing, Siddon made do with minimal control and limited finances, with the standard northern policy awkwardness of involvement from four departments, requiring ultimate authorization from the Privy Council for any finances sequestered.

As with Diefenbaker before him, Mulroney recognized that though native people north of the provincial border did not represent a large or particularly vocal portion of the public,⁷⁸ their issues were becoming increasingly personal further south as the role of federal provider versus territorial receiver became less distinct in the need for evidence of Canadian northern sovereignty. With issues like the Polar Sea problem, Canada had begun looking for strategic claims to ensure her “northern footprint” was firmly recorded in areas like the Arctic Archipelago - a historical footprint that could only be attributed to Inuit. Mulroney responded with tactical policies (many of which originated in his first term) to strengthen the Canadian/First Nations relationship, such as increasing Aboriginal influence in northern schools. In 1983, 3% of Northwest Territories teachers were local, by 1992, 30% were. Political strategist at heart, Mulroney recognized that teaching a southern curriculum that discussed southern items such as elevators and Thanksgiving Dinner was not marketable as politically respectful or appropriate. Federal approval was given to create local Aboriginal school advisory commissions for an

⁷⁷Raymond Blake, *Transforming the Nation: Canada and Brian Mulroney* (Quebec: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007), p. 348.

⁷⁸ In fact they did not represent one group at all, but a mix of Dene, Inuit and Metis, with different beliefs, history, culture, and needs, only united in dissatisfaction towards the Federal government.

improved curriculum.⁷⁹ The CAEDS grant programme provided First Nations entrepreneurs with funding access for business ventures in a post NEP economy. This was managed by appointed, increasingly aboriginal boards.⁸⁰ Funding to the Territorial legislatures offered longer term, five year Federal “Formula Financing” instead of a one year system, to allow for improvements to education, healthcare and housing. This included dramatically higher monetary resources, for example health care, from \$98M in 1987 to over \$173M in 1992. Unfortunately, though policies were enacted, few local-level results were seen in the realm of education and housing. First Nations graduates decreased in numbers over the Mulroney years, and the Northwest Territories Legislative Assembly’s Special Committee on Housing, created in 1984 to address the 1000 plus units shortage in housing, had by 1990 an increased shortage of 3000 units.⁸¹ Fortunately for the government, distance and general ignorance decreased public need for such tangible evidence of northern improvements, as did problems like that of Oka, the Quebec-Mohawks confrontation in 1990, which cost tax payers \$112 million in 70 days.⁸² The response from the southern public acknowledged the fact that northern efforts were being made by the Mulroney government (if on a tight budget), easing the collective conscience and strengthening the footprint, without too much damage to an increasingly unsteady national financial situation.

Besides the growing international interest in human rights⁸³ and Canadian need to keep northern First Nations on side through a tactical political strategy to preserve the Federal stake in

⁷⁹ Mark Dickerson, *Whose North? Political Change, Political Development, and Self-Government in the Northwest Territories* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1992), p. 130.

⁸⁰ Blake, *Transforming the Nation: Canada and Brian Mulroney* (Quebec: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007), p. 347.

⁸¹ Mark Dickerson, *Whose North? Political Change, Political Development, and Self-Government in the Northwest Territories* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1992), p. 126.

⁸² Paul Newman, *The Secret Mulroney Tapes: Unguarded Confessions of a Prime Minister* (Toronto: Random House, 2005), p. 9.

⁸³ Such as with the ending of Apartheid in South Africa.

northern resources in case the Territories should desire Meech Lake-inspired independence, an increasingly popular (and therefore motivating) issue in the early 1990s was the environment. Acid rain became a southern Canadian problem in the late 1980s, raising awareness of similar issues. In 1992, Canada signed the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, AEPS, to establish international regulations in the Arctic Circle. Heavy metals, radioactive isotopes and industrial chemicals were growing in volume, and it was suspected that Russia was dumping nuclear waste in the water. No official international cooperative organization was formed until post-Mulroney in 1996, with the Arctic Council; however Mulroney had proposed a regional forum with Russia for Arctic Cooperation in 1989.⁸⁴

In 1993, Mulroney's government carried with it a growing national debt, a scandalous history incapacitating public trust, the failure of Meech Lake and Charlottetown that further disintegrated an already fractured nation, and failure of the anti "Big Ottawa" coalition who over time realized their joint animosity wasn't enough to build future-orientated policies and a sense of national purpose. Mulroney resigned, leaving the Conservative government in disarray. The northern policies Mulroney issued while elected, unlike Diefenbaker's economic-opportunity-focused northern era, were increasingly sovereignty-focused. The north became significant over the Mulroney era to national unity and international sovereignty through the Polar Sea problem, through maintaining a Canadian northern footprint, and forming detailed land ownership protocols that could be applied throughout the north.

⁸⁴ Coates et al, *Arctic Front: Defending Canada in the Far North* (Toronto: Thomas Allen Publishers, 2008), p. 128.

CHAPTER 2: THE NEW ROLE OF FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 2006 ELECTION

INTRODUCTION

To understand why and how Stephen Harper introduced, refined and promoted a northern-focused foreign policy in his 2006 platform and campaign, it is necessary to first consider Harper's objective, what he felt needed to be achieved in 2006 that was not successfully achieved in 2004 to get elected.

At the May 1996 "Winds of Change" talk in Calgary, Alberta, as an elected Member of Parliament for the Reform Party (the same party that in 1993 fragmented the coalition of his conservative predecessor, Brian Mulroney, of whom he had once been a strong supporter), Harper had explained that "conservatism in Canada had only been successful at the national level when it managed to bring together traditional Toryism, strong in Ontario and Atlantic Canada; grassroots populism, dominant in the west and parts of rural Ontario; and French-Canadian nationalism, the regnant worldview in Quebec."⁸⁵ These three groups had some potential similarities in their objectives, and as he had explained in 1996/7 in "Our Benign Dictatorship," his desire was to build a functional conservative coalition of all three:

If cooperation [as opposed to merger] is ever to work, the fragments of Canadian conservatism must recognize that each represents an authentic aspect of a larger conservative philosophy. Reformers will have to realize that there is something genuinely conservative in the Tory penchant for compromise and incrementalism. Tories will have to admit that compromise, to be honourable, must be guided by underlying principles, and

⁸⁵ Tom Flanagan, *Harper's Team: Behind the Scenes in the Conservative Rise to Power* (Quebec: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007), p. 16.

that Reformers are not extremists for openly advocating smaller government, free markets, traditional values and equality before the law. And both will have to recognize that Quebec nationalism, while not in itself a conservative movement, appeals to the kind of voters who in other provinces support conservative parties.”⁸⁶

Due to several perhaps unavoidable reasons such as being a brand new party, with a relatively unknown leader, the Conservative campaign to get elected in 2004 failed, but it was decided that there was opportunity for success in the next campaign. The insurmountables specific to 2004, like being new, unrecognized, lacking time for platform and campaign planning, and having to transition the winning of the Alliance leadership into the PC/Alliance merger, then on into the run for Prime Ministership were not the only concerns. Tactics were desired to facilitate the unity of those same three aforementioned groups, western populism, traditional Toryism, and Quebecois nationalism, the “three sisters” that Harper himself had described in “Our Benign Dictatorship,” the former two of which were now operating under a merger. Post-election, Harper initiated an evaluative “house cleaning,” creating plans and protocols on a practical level, and forging those common conservative pillars on a theoretical level, on which to hang the unifying tent:

In a country as geographically, linguistically, culturally, ethnically, philosophically, and economically diverse as Canada, Liberals have figured out that they could never win the number of seats required to gain confidence by speaking to a narrow range of interests, grievances, or communities. To win, a

⁸⁶ Tom Flanagan and Stephen Harper, “Our Benign Dictatorship” *The Next City* (1997).

party needs to build a coalition of interests. Some call it a “big tent”: a place that can comfortably and peacefully accommodate a large number of voters.⁸⁷

As Harper’s team would come to realize, common ground for a coalition of interests did exist, able to encompass 4000 kilometres worth of right-of-centre beliefs, and it lay above the sixtieth parallel, in policies and strategies for “the north,” in the land of both shared opportunity and shared vulnerability.

CAMPAIGN 2004: ESTABLISHING A LONG TERM OBJECTIVE

Stephen Harper was chosen leader of the new Conservative Party in March 2004, and the party was still new and fragile when the election was called in May.⁸⁸ The Conservatives lacked cohesive objectives or a known leader. The principles that had been agreed upon in the merger were taken from the previous PC platform, and were not indicative of Harper’s pan-conservative cooperation objectives, divulged in his writings and talks in the 1990s. However, as a strategic part of the longer-term objective, they were what was needed to achieve the merger so that the new Conservatives could then begin establishing a platform with policies capable of supporting social to fiscal, populist to traditional, Quebec-nationalist to Canadian-nationalist, libertarian to monarchist ideologies, through “incremental change, and a strong sense of honourable compromise.”⁸⁹ Unfortunately for the 2004 campaign, with no mention of core Alliance values such as a triple-E Senate, family-unit protection, or need for American cooperation, or of values

⁸⁷ Bob Plamondon, *Full Circle: Death and Resurrection in Canadian Conservative Politics* (Toronto, Ontario: Key Porter Books, 2006), pp. 28-29.

⁸⁸ This was likely a motivation for Liberal Prime Minister Paul Martin to call the election in May 2004.

⁸⁹ Tom Flanagan, *Harper’s Team: Behind the Scenes in the Conservative Rise to Power* (Quebec: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007), p. 16.

of the Quebec nationalists, such as “the Catholic social doctrines of personalism and subsidiarity, anti-materialist and imbued with spiritual values,”⁹⁰ the mistrustful public saw a centralist traditional platform led by an aloof right-wing leader, its imbalance aggravated by the need for haste and making of first-timer blunders.

The political status quo in May 2004 saw the Liberals in a majority government with a well known and popular leader, Paul Martin, who had the added glory of having been Jean Chretien’s Minister of Finance, doing wonders for the debt and deficit.⁹¹ So with a popular personality and strong financials, Martin was a difficult act to compete with. Having said this, the Liberals lacked a distinctive 2004 campaign mission, and with an over-sized cabinet that included Quebec Ministers who were mostly loyalists from Chretien’s cabinet, Martin’s circumstances led to a drifting campaign.

The 2004 Harper campaign focused on the predominantly PC policy, receiving positive feedback in the opinion polls, until after three weeks their “war room”⁹² simply ran out of material. They subsequently tried to capitalize on one of Martin’s poorly handled experiences, the child pornography issue, which they overdramatized, and it consequently backfired.⁹³ The Liberal team used negative advertising, focusing specifically on Harper’s traditional take on subjects like abortion, while offering promises to fix health care,⁹⁴ and making opportunistic use of the continuous bad press regarding various Conservative MPs’ troubles. For the Liberals, their campaign was successful in that they won the election, but also a failure in that they won

90 Maria Montserrat Guibernau, *The Identity of Nations* (Massachusetts, USA: Polity Press, 2007), p. 34.

91 It is arguable that Martin actually reaped the financial rewards of the Mulroney years changes, and transferred the rest of the deficit to the provinces.

92 Campaign headquarters from which platforms, scripts and campaign instructions are issued.

93 The child pornography issue was an overused and overstated concern by the Harper war room that Martin had not taken a strong enough stand against child pornography in Canada in response to a loophole in the legislation.

94 Tom Flanagan, *Harper’s Team: Behind the Scenes in the Conservative Rise to Power* (Quebec: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007), p. 163.

only a minority government. Depending on political stance, due to being new and run off their feet, or due to being badly prepared and inadequate for the job, the Conservatives lost much support when they ran out of content. They also lacked campaign topics relevant to all three of the conservative sisters. Quebec was offered a poor campaign slogan,⁹⁵ no concept on which to build unity with the west and centre, and an unknown party leader. The traditional Tories were divided, with some support from Ontario, but with Atlantic Canada retracting its loyalty mostly due to a quip Harper had made in 2002.⁹⁶ The populist west was fairly reliable, but not enough by itself to win an election. The west also had some animosity, concerned that their core values were not adequately represented by the post-merger Conservative policies, with its initial principles still based on the PC Party.

PLATFORM 2004: AWAKENING TO NORTHERN POTENTIAL

The 2004 platform, written by Ken Boessenkool, Harper's senior policy advisor, responsible for integrating policy and communications and general political strategy, was prepared in less than two months as another item on Boessenkool's to-do list concisely summarized as "the scripting plan. The communications plan. And the... platform."⁹⁷ It is a long, academic and dry document, devoid of pictures, inspirational visions, or memorable associations that make such documents appealing to the eye. The conception that would later gain recognition as a demographically inclusive pillar on which to hang the Conservative tent, northern policy, was

⁹⁵ 2004 Conservative campaign slogan "Demand better" was translated to French as "C'est assez," or "we've had enough," which appeared to be a Bloc Québécois-type slogan, not a Conservative one.

⁹⁶ The quip described a "culture of defeat," for which Harper apologized in next campaign. Tom Flanagan, *Harper's Team: Behind the Scenes in the Conservative Rise to Power* (Quebec: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007), p. 193.

⁹⁷ Paul Wells, *Right Side Up: The Fall of Paul Martin and the Rise of Stephen Harper's New Conservatism* (Toronto, Ontario: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 2006), p. 114.

non-existent as a title or sub-title in this platform. It came up more than once only in the section discussing Canada's Armed Forces, under "Demand Better Security."⁹⁸ Though not by any means exclusively concerned with the north, Canada's Armed Forces is significant, as its equipment, budget and personnel are key aspects of what would grow in the next platform into the northern sovereignty pillar.

Boessenkool used the 2004 Canadian Armed Forces section to plant seeds of discontent amongst any Canadians concerned with defence, sovereignty, realistic budgeting or international respect: "Canada finds itself unable to assert its sovereignty over our northern islands and waters due to a lack of personnel and equipment,"⁹⁹ "our search and rescue operations are still waiting for a new helicopter to replace the aging, dangerous Sea Kings."¹⁰⁰ He offered criticism of Liberal military spending, saying "the purchase of Challenger jets for cabinet ministers was approved in a single day,"¹⁰¹ though "in 2001, the Auditor General said the military needed an immediate infusion of over \$1 billion per year simply to maintain equipment safety and replace outdated equipment,"¹⁰² which did not occur. Boessenkool and Harper's solutions to what they probably considered more a good opportunity for criticizing the Liberals than an opportunity to unite the right with trans-conservative progressively north-focused defence policies, are described without much detail: A non-regionally specific overall injection of \$1.2 billion per year for equipment, aiming one day to achieve the NATO European average as a percentage of GDP; a gradual increase in forces to a total of 80,000 plus higher reserve levels; and renewal of equipment including the northern-relevant coast guard, long-range unmanned air vehicle (UAV)

⁹⁸ Conservative Party of Canada, *Demanding Better: Conservative Party of Canada Platform 2004*, p. 41.

⁹⁹ Conservative Party of Canada, *Demanding Better: Conservative Party of Canada Platform 2004*, p. 41.

¹⁰⁰ Conservative Party of Canada, *Demanding Better: Conservative Party of Canada Platform 2004*, p. 41.

¹⁰¹ Conservative Party of Canada, *Demanding Better: Conservative Party of Canada Platform 2004*, p. 41.

¹⁰² Conservative Party of Canada, *Demanding Better: Conservative Party of Canada Platform 2004*, p. 41.

and satellite surveillance, with the enhancement of Parliamentary oversight to defence policy and military equipment procurement, so degeneration of Canadian military forces and equipment could be prevented in the future.¹⁰³

Other northern content besides the Armed Forces material, though scarce, is mentionable because of its later refinement into a different pillar for the conservative tent: social policy, to act as evidence of Conservative compassion for those in need; and an economic strategy to fulfill these promises. The platform describes general improvements to economic and social conditions for aboriginal Canadians,¹⁰⁴ and more specifically, encouraging “development of a property regime on reserves to allow individual property ownership (to) encourage lending for private housing and businesses,” “a matrimonial property code to protect spouses and children in cases of (reserve-residing Aboriginal) marriage breakdown,”¹⁰⁵ and supporting aboriginal choice regarding which schooling system their children attend including funding. Northern industry potential is introduced through practical vocational safeguards for northern residents, including extending “the two hundred mile limit to the edge of the Continental Shelf, the Nose and Tail of the Grand Banks, and the Flemish Cap in the North Atlantic,”¹⁰⁶ and developing “a fisheries managerial framework that gives provinces and territories more input and control over fisheries management.”¹⁰⁷

The last significant aspect of the 2004 platform is its posture concerning the United States. As with northern policy in general, the Conservative take on the United States was not

¹⁰³ Conservative Party of Canada, *Demanding Better: Conservative Party of Canada Platform 2004*, p. 41.

¹⁰⁴ Aboriginal Canadians neither reside exclusively in the north, nor are the north’s sole residents, but do represent a significant portion of residents, and more importantly, are associated by media with northern policies so resultantly are a key part of the Conservative government’s northern political strategy.

¹⁰⁵ Conservative Party of Canada, *Demanding Better: Conservative Party of Canada Platform 2004*, p. 30.

¹⁰⁶ Conservative Party of Canada, *Demanding Better: Conservative Party of Canada Platform 2004*, p. 20.

¹⁰⁷ Conservative Party of Canada, *Demanding Better: Conservative Party of Canada Platform 2004*, p. 20.

particularly dramatic or motivational for voters in spring 2004, but it would become more so in the next campaign, so is relevant as a point of reference. The document mentions the USA solely in relation to trade, desiring a stronger relationship for border security, with a succinct criticism of the Liberal attitude towards America.^{108 109} In the Armed Forces section, there is absolutely no mention of the United States, of need for defence relations such as NORAD, of the missile defence system, or of Canada's need for sovereignty independence from America regarding military acts on Canadian soil. In late spring of 2004, America simply was not an issue for Conservative policy.

PUBLIC FEEDBACK: CONCERN FOR STRENGTHENING NATIONAL SECURITY GROWS IN THE MEDIA

The primary public feedback from the extremely condensed Conservative campaign and platform of 2004 was obvious with the failure to get elected. There were a few impressive statistics, such as the fact that the Conservative party managed to come out of the operation with no debt, due to their refusal to engage in expensive negative advertising;¹¹⁰ or that Conservative pre-election parliament seats totaled 78,¹¹¹ with their post election seats totaling 99.¹¹² Harper and his team decided this showed enough progress to justify trying again in the next election, and began an attentive analysis of public dissatisfaction expressed in the media. The media gave suggestions of Conservative failures including: Lack of common interest/connection with

¹⁰⁸ "Canadians have been embarrassed by Liberal MPs and Prime Ministerial aides saying they 'hate' Americans or calling them 'morons'," Conservative Party of Canada, *Demanding Better: Conservative Party of Canada Platform 2004*, p. 35.

¹⁰⁹ As will be later discussed, this attitude also proved hypocritical with the Liberal/US missile cooperation plan.

¹¹⁰ And many speculate that the Liberal negative advertising won them the election.

¹¹¹ Pre merger: 66 Alliance; 12 PC. Elections Canada, *Thirty-seventh General Election 2000: Official Voting Results: Synopsis*. Retrieved May 20, 2010 from

<http://www.elections.ca/content.asp?section=gen&document=synopsis06&dir=rep/37g&lang=e&textonly=false>.

¹¹² Elections Canada, *Report of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada*. Retrieved on May 20, 2010 from

http://elections.ca/content.asp?section=gen&document=p1&dir=rep/re2/sta_lab2005&lang=e&textonly=false.

Quebec, consequently losing votes to the Bloc;^{113 114} and erratic trust in Ontario and the Maritimes, losing votes to the Liberals.¹¹⁵ It discussed public interest in and expectations regarding government policies for improved national security,¹¹⁶ a sustainable budget for all policy,^{117 118} evaluation of the degree of military capacity Canada can and should have,¹¹⁹ and acceptable levels of cooperation with the United States.¹²⁰ It suggested that some people were beginning to see these areas in Liberal policy as hypocritical: Liberal security, budget and US relations policy appeared progressively short-sighted, viewed skeptically by the public, and tactically weak,¹²¹ offering potential in the next election for exploitation, appealing to all three

¹¹³ “As for Stephen Harper, what he needs badly is someone with stature in Quebec to build around, ...so that next time out, the Tories can offer themselves as a truly pan-Canadian alternative. This would also help in Ontario, where unity-minded voters tend to shy away from parties shunned by Quebecers.” Norman Webster, “Harper Badly Needs a Quebec Team,” *Montreal Gazette*, July 3rd, 2004, p. A 27.

¹¹⁴ “To do better next time, they will have to find a way to connect with Quebecers,” “...and break into suburban and urban seats in vote-rich Ontario...” Norman Spector, “Canada is at risk of becoming even more divided,” *Victoria Times – Colonist*, July 2nd, 2004, p. A 12.

¹¹⁵ “But it (Harper’s fashioning of a new Conservative party) wasn’t enough, because at the last minute the capricious urban Ontario voters changed their minds... (b)lame the nonsense over abortion. Blame the Liberal attack ads, blame Stephen Harper’s Alberta heritage and his avowed fondness for all things American.” John Ibbitson, “Urban Ontario’s fickle voters leave Harper out in the cold,” *Toronto Globe & Mail*, June 29, 2004, p. A1.

¹¹⁶ “It was encouraging during the recent campaign to hear defence policy actually discussed. Other than the NDP’s initial call decades ago for Canada to leave NATO,” Lewis Mackenzie. “Don’t overlook defence,” *Ottawa Citizen*, Jul 22, 2004, p. A.17.

¹¹⁷ “Question: ‘Will a federal party with true conservative principles every be electable in Canada?’ Answer (Campbell): ‘Yes, but the Common Sense Revolution proved that the common ground must be founded on a vision of economic conservatism - - this must be the fundamental focus of our newly merged Conservative party.’” Linda Frum, “Five strategists, four questions,” *National Post*, Jul 17, 2004, p. A.21.

¹¹⁸ “He (Martin) will need to keep the budget more or less in balance, lest he hand the Conservatives a fat election issue,” Geoffrey Stevens, “Liberals have keen sense of self-preservation,” *Guelph Daily Mercury*, Jul 12, 2004, p. A.6.

¹¹⁹ “In February’s budget, Martin promised the military an extra \$600 million over five years. Harper’s response was to pledge an additional \$1.2 billion a year immediately for defence, rising to \$1.6 billion over five years... Many military analysts, however, say neither of these policies addresses the core structural dilapidation of the military, which needs at least an additional \$4 billion a year to make a difference,” “Canadians need to decide what role they want the military to play so it can be properly equipped for the tasks.” Jonathan Manthorpe, “Foreign affairs will continue to suffer after the election,” *Ottawa Citizen*, Jul 4, 2004, p. A.12.

¹²⁰ “I’m big on national defence and on feeling safe in my home country, so if Canada won’t do the job I’m all for letting America handle it, all for Strategic Defence Initiative research.” Todd Hambleton, “Post-election pondering,” *Cornwall Standard – Freeholder*, Jul 5, 2004, p. 8.

¹²¹ “(S)ince the 1970s (Canada) has been forced to charter merchant ships from the lowest bidder and rent aging Ukrainian aircraft to deploy our forces in an untimely and tactically unsound manner.” Lewis Mackenzie, “Don’t overlook defence,” *Ottawa Citizen*, Jul 22, 2004, p. A.17.

conservative sisters. By renting military equipment rather than purchasing,¹²² the Liberals had appeared financially savvy, saving money at least in the short term. They had offered no alternative policies to continue a sovereignty vision, in particular for land north of sixty, like that of Mulroney's Canadian-owned icebreakers, nuclear submarines or trained personnel, to protect what was becoming progressively internationally significant land and water. The media also acknowledged that the Liberals gave public opposition to cooperation with the US military while simultaneously signing an anti-missile defence partnership with the USA.¹²³ In the post 2004 election Liberal position of being a minority government, requiring NDP, Conservative or Bloc support to pass legislation, such feedback might prove opportunistic for the Conservatives in the next election.^{124 125}

REFINEMENT PHASE 1 – THE MARCH 2005 POLICY MANUAL: EXPANDING THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PILLAR

Campaign weakness in Quebec had led to the unpopular but strategic decision to host the Conservative Party Policy Convention in March 2005 in Montreal. Convention conclusions included a more centrist face for the party and next platform than Harper's personal perspectives:

¹²² "It was Robert Coates, former minister of National Defence, who months after the election -- won by the Mulroney government -- went to visit the troops and found the Liberals had a rent-a-tank scheme." Don Cameron, "Liberals continue to misrepresent the truth," *Kamloops Daily News*, July 15, 2004, p. A.6.

¹²³ "He (Martin) has signed on to a partnership with Washington to develop a continental anti-missile defence system and has promised the Canadian armed forces new ships, tanks, helicopters and Jeeps." Jonathan Manthorpe, "Foreign affairs will continue to suffer after the election," *Ottawa Citizen*, Jul 4, 2004, p. A.12.

¹²⁴ "He (Martin) now may be pressured into rejecting Canadian participation in missile defence. And any business-friendly agenda -- further deregulation, say, or renewed efforts to boost productivity -- will be off limits." Drew Fagan, "How Martin came back from brink," *Toronto Globe & Mail*, June 29, 2004, p. A.1.

¹²⁵ "He's (Martin is) also going to have to come up with a great deal of money to re-equip the Canadian Forces (which will temporarily endear him to the Conservatives) without getting drawn into a U.S.-driven missile defence system (which would alienate the NDP and Bloc)," Geoffrey Stevens, "Liberals have keen sense of self-preservation," *Guelph Daily Mercury*, Jul 12, 2004, p. A.6.

pro-choice, pro-bilingualism, anti-gay-marriage.¹²⁶ The loss of traditional Ontario and Maritime Tories to the Liberals also led to the running of a brochure to garner ethnic and Catholic support in Ontario and the Maritimes, based on opposition to same-sex marriage.¹²⁷ These were unifying tactics, but not a coalition strategy in them selves. Having already exposed some Liberal hypocrisies and inconsistencies, Harper's team recognized the growing public desire for a sustainable economic plan to finance problems like Canadian national security, and the need for a viable military strategy to do it. It was unknown when the next election would take place, but spring of 2005 seemed possible. As a result, a platform had to be created in preparation, though the attempt to force an election misfired, and the election was not held until January of 2006.¹²⁸ This platform was never published and would be dramatically modified over the subsequent eight months, thanks to feedback from Harper's advisors and Harper himself, into something different come the election. It is a useful document, however, since it reveals the progression of Conservative thought concerning the refinement of northern policy in the aim to win the next election.

The March 2005 policy manual, unlike the 2004 platform which had no northern section at all, offered a brief paragraph on northern development in section F- 36. However, most northern policy was actually contained, as with the 2004 platform, in National Defence and Security, section V, with a little in Aboriginal Affairs, section L. With more realistic numbers than the 2004 platform, National Defence and Security suggested an inkling of Conservative

¹²⁶ Paul Wells, *Right Side Up: The Fall of Paul Martin and the Rise of Stephen Harper's New Conservatism* (Toronto, Ontario: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 2006), p. 144.

¹²⁷ Tom Flanagan, *Harper's Team: Behind the Scenes in the Conservative Rise to Power* (Quebec: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007), p. 200-201.

¹²⁸ Between 1997 and 2003, \$100 million dollars of fees and commissions to Liberal-connected communications agencies were unaccounted for with specific jobs. The goal had been to make Canadian Government more prominent in Quebec, but little real work was ever proved.

awareness as to the potential for the security of Canada's vast north to invoke cooperation amongst the inflexible and sometimes apathetic three conservative sisters. The notion of a "Canada First Defence Policy," summarized as "the security of the Canadian nation and the economic prosperity of the Canadian people,"¹²⁹ was delivered in eight points. The March 2005 policy manual issued its goal as being "sovereignty protection, domestic defence, and North American shared defence... international peace and security missions as well as humanitarian assistance,"¹³⁰ clearly placing sovereignty and defence of the homeland first. Bearing in mind that the sovereignty and defence of the homeland included an increasingly vulnerable Arctic,¹³¹ very relevant to all Canadians with its east to west span, northern defence moved forward into a more significant (though not exclusive) part of defence policy than previously.

The specific requirements to achieve these promises were better summarized (for those besides military specialists) than in the 2004 platform, with the issuing of "multi-role, combat capable maritime, land and air force... national surveillance and control, counter terrorism, air and sea deployability, as well as logistics supportability."¹³² Surveillance capacity is significant due to the need for improved awareness in the unpopulated but progressively melting and thus accessible northern territory. Combat forces are relevant, in case of invasion, including from the Arctic waters.¹³³ Typically vague and omniscient promises were issued, aspiring to better efficiency and effectiveness, but they did include relevant domestic defence details to back them up.¹³⁴ Numbers were provided, of an increase to at least 75 000 personnel,¹³⁵ fewer than the

¹²⁹ Conservative Party of Canada, *Policy Declaration* (March 19, 2005), p, 41, V, 109.

¹³⁰ Conservative Party of Canada, *Policy Declaration* (March 19, 2005), p. 41-42, V, 109, i.

¹³¹ Due to global warming making access year round more possible.

¹³² Conservative Party of Canada, *Policy Declaration* (March 19, 2005), p. 42, V, 109, ii.

¹³³ For example: non-permitted visitors to the Northwest Passage, or claimants to ocean territory and its resources, like the Lomonosov Ridge.

¹³⁴ "Improved security of our territory... a more efficient and properly funded national procurement process; increased investments in infrastructure with a specific care to married quarters and base housing; a more efficient

2004 platform's 80 000 goal. Numeric details did not extend to the financials like those of 2004,¹³⁶ and are summarized simply with "immediately injecting significant funds into the Department's budget,"¹³⁷ with further "annual increases"¹³⁸ to ultimately achieve the same as was suggested in 2004, "the NATO European average as a percentage of G.D.P."¹³⁹ It is speculative whether this decrease in financial subsidization was due to concern for accountability later, or perhaps fears of deterring coalition unity based on differing opinions, even amongst conservatives, as to what constitutes appropriate Arctic, domestic or international defence spending. The building of the described equipment, which the suggested volume of personnel would need, with such money as was being portrayed as available to create defence priorities as listed, including several fundamental to northern defence, was discreetly suggestive of a potentially massive stimulus to national industrial productivity, "through such sectors as shipbuilding, aerospace, electronics, and land systems among others."¹⁴⁰ This was bolstered by the statement that "it is essential to ensure Canadian defence industry has access to the United States defence procurement market."¹⁴¹

Point 7 of the Canada First Defence Policy discussed specifics such as the division of roles in defending northern sovereignty between Canada and the USA. After offering support for continued cooperation with the USA to defend North America including NORAD to protect aerospace, further negotiations for a North American Missile Defence System that serves

training and recruitment process... and an increase in Parliamentary oversight over national defence matters."

Conservative Party of Canada, *Policy Declaration* (March 19, 2005), p. 42, V, 109, iii.

¹³⁵ Conservative Party of Canada, *Policy Declaration* (March 19, 2005), p. 42, V, 109, iv.

¹³⁶ \$1.2 billion per year for equipment.

¹³⁷ Conservative Party of Canada, *Policy Declaration* (March 19, 2005), p. 42, V, 109, v.

¹³⁸ Conservative Party of Canada, *Policy Declaration* (March 19, 2005), p. 42, V, 109, v.

¹³⁹ Conservative Party of Canada, *Policy Declaration* (March 19, 2005), p. 42, V, 109, vi.

¹⁴⁰ Conservative Party of Canada, *Policy Declaration* (March 19, 2005), p. 42, V, 109, viii.

¹⁴¹ Conservative Party of Canada, *Policy Declaration* (March 19, 2005), p. 42, V, 109, viii.

Canadian interests, and the need for Canadian sovereign and independent command for all operations on Canadian territory,¹⁴² point 7 explains the Conservative belief that there is a need for “Immediate moves to increase equipment and resources to exercise Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic.”¹⁴³ This is the first and only direct mention of the Arctic, introducing the need to assert northern sovereignty with actions, not words and symbolic acts. Point 7 outlines Conservative perspectives on tolerability when divvying up defence responsibilities with the Canadian neighbour to the south. It is based on a reality that the USA’s navy is bigger than the seventeen next largest navies combined, and consequently Canada needs a strategy for northern defence cooperation with the United States, while mindful of national sovereignty.

Northern industry potential, almost undiscussed in the 2004 platform, is specifically assessed in sections F, Economic Development, including F-36, Northern Development; and F-38, Mining; I, Environment, including I-46, Oil and Gas; and as in the 2004 platform, S, Fisheries. The Conservative suggestions for northern industry included more investment in mining geoscience and promotion of offshore oil and gas research,¹⁴⁴ both of which would require concrete policy in section L, regarding Aboriginal territorial devolutionary rights and residential rights. On a less popular but still publically relevant note, it continued by recognizing need for careful maintenance of a valuable resource, the northern fish stock,^{145 146} with various

¹⁴² Conservative Party of Canada, *Policy Declaration* (March 19, 2005), p. 42, V, 109, vii, a, b, c, d.

¹⁴³ Conservative Party of Canada, *Policy Declaration* (March 19, 2005), p. 42, V, 109, vii, e.

¹⁴⁴ “A Conservative government will promote exploration and environmental assessment of offshore natural resources on both the Pacific and Atlantic coasts, in cooperation with the provinces, affected First Nations, private industry and other relevant scientific and environmental groups.” Conservative Party of Canada, *Policy Declaration* (March 19, 2005), p. 18, I, 46.

¹⁴⁵ “Responsibility must come from participating regions where more decision making must be located so that wild stocks, as well as aquaculture, can be managed appropriately.” Conservative Party of Canada, *Policy Declaration* (March 19, 2005), p. 36, S, 99, iii.

¹⁴⁶ “A Conservative Government will adopt, with any interested coastal province or territory, a system of increased provincial management over fisheries through a system of joint management and joint fisheries councils...” Conservative Party of Canada, *Policy Declaration* (March 19, 2005), p. 37, S, 99, v.

international considerations.¹⁴⁷ Regarding the subsection Northern Development, the single paragraph briefly iterates Conservative commitment to economic development of all three territories including a resource revenue sharing agreement,¹⁴⁸ drawing attention to resource potential in the territories and the consequential economic significance of devolution of the Northern Development portfolio from the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs.¹⁴⁹

The Aboriginal Affairs section, L, is different than the 2004 platform in its division into six sections that clearly list the Conservative interpretation of concerns and needs of aboriginal people, all of which are relevant to the north.¹⁵⁰ The policy manual turns the vague 2004 platform's mission, to improve economic and social conditions for Aboriginal Canadians, into specifics. It discusses the need for a legislated framework of expenditures, replacing the Indian Act with a legal and democratic authority devolution plan, transparency in financials, staying within the constitutional guidelines, a new framework to resolve comprehensive land settlement claims, and settlement of older specific claims.¹⁵¹ All six points add substance to the idea of building a compassionate social pillar on which to hang the Conservative tent, relevant to reserves across the nation including Aboriginal northern residents. Northern relevance is compounded with discussion of the Inuit in point ii, Self Government - Legal and Democratic Authority.¹⁵² It describes the lack of modern legislation to provide the Inuit a way to self-management of their own laws, and offers a prompt to the voting public to remember that

¹⁴⁷ "...work(ing) to eliminate unfair international trade bans on Canadian seal products." Conservative Party of Canada, *Policy Declaration* (March 19, 2005), p. 37, S, 99, vi.

¹⁴⁸ Principles to share resource revenues within the territories without approval of the federal government.

¹⁴⁹ Conservative Party of Canada, *Policy Declaration* (March 19, 2005), p. 13, F, 36.

¹⁵⁰ As stated previously, Aboriginal Canadians neither reside exclusively in the north, nor are the north's sole residents, but do represent a significant portion of residents, and more importantly, are associated by media with northern policies so resultantly are a key part of the Conservative government's northern political strategy.

¹⁵¹ Conservative Party of Canada, *Policy Declaration* (March 19, 2005), p. 26-29, L.

¹⁵² The fundamental obligation of the federal government is to improve the living conditions of Aboriginal Canadians, including the Inuit, in terms of economic opportunity, health, education, and community safety.

northern residents' states of affairs, including the Inuit, have arguably not been taken care of under a Liberal government.¹⁵³

Section L is utilized not only to enlist an emotional response in Canadians via the need for dramatically improved Aboriginal Affairs policies, but is also used as an opportunity to clarify pan-coalition conservative core beliefs in reference to the First Nations' circumstances:

[First Nations deserve] the flexibility to determine for themselves, whether and how free market principles, such as individual property ownership should apply to reserve lands. Self government should be accomplished in a manner which takes into account the cultural and linguistic diversity of Canada's First Nations. Within the context of the Canadian Constitution, we should be prepared to make flexible accommodations for the protection of language and culture within self-government agreements.¹⁵⁴

Addressing these issues, the need for settlement of land claims according to conservative core beliefs, for justice and compassion towards a maltreated Canadian minority, illustrate that the rights of Aboriginals have been handled incorrectly,¹⁵⁵ and may impact the nation in the form of inadequate self-government agreements; this bearing more significance due to the introduction of

¹⁵³ "Legislation should be developed which governs programs and which prescribes the standards of service which the federal government has undertaken to provide to aboriginal Canadians." Conservative Party of Canada, *Policy Declaration* (March 19, 2005), p. 27, L, 72, ii.

¹⁵⁴ Conservative Party of Canada, *Policy Declaration* (March 19, 2005), p. 26-27, L, 72, i.

¹⁵⁵ The Resolution of Existing Specific Claims and Lawsuits against the Federal Crown: The jurisdiction of the Federal Court should be expanded and the arbitrary ambit of the Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC). Minister and the Specific Claims Policy contracted to eliminate the inherent conflict of interest of the Federal Crown in the resolution of 'specific claims'. Conservative Party of Canada, *Policy Declaration* (March 19, 2005), p. 28, L, 72, vi.

northern industry in sections F, I and S, potentially on northern Aboriginal land. The Conservative policy manual summarizes this: “(We will) provide justice for Aboriginal claimants, together with certainty for Government, industry and non-Aboriginal Canadians.”¹⁵⁶

National Defence and Security, Aboriginal Affairs and industry potential move away from the 2004 predecessor’s combination of Liberal criticism and inflated Conservative promises, into a more assertive and comprehensive strategy. They utilize the situation in northern Canada to stimulate thoughts and feelings about what Canada is doing to protect herself through domestic defence and arctic sovereignty, and to prove that conservatism has the capacity to synchronize compassion into its northern social policy. The policy manual conveys convincing northern industry arguments to broaden the horizons of the generally liberal public mentality via a Conservative strategy for economic development. All these aspects aim to ignite within the Canadian right an emotion that Liberal philosophy often ignores: Patriotism.

REFINEMENT PHASE 2 – THE NEVER-RELEASED MAY 2005 PLATFORM: EXPANDING THE SOVEREIGNTY PILLAR

On April 21, 2005, Paul Martin issued a promise for an election call within 30 days of the final Gomery report, expected on December 15th. Stephen Harper’s Conservatives responded with an attempted non-confidence vote in parliament on the 19th of May, but due to NDP support for the Liberals,¹⁵⁷ it failed. The platform, created in preparation for the non-confidence vote, is summarized in Harper’s Team by Dr. Tom Flanagan as being

¹⁵⁶ Conservative Party of Canada, Policy Declaration (March 19, 2005), p. 28, L, 72, vii.

¹⁵⁷ Perhaps due to a promise of swapping \$3.6 billion in tax cuts for \$4.6 billion in NDP policy-favoured areas, Tom Flanagan, *Harper’s Team: Behind the Scenes in the Conservative Rise to Power* (Quebec: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007), p. 213.

more like a longer version of its 2004 predecessor than like the one that eventually helped us win the 2006 election. Although it was full of detail, it lacked the imaginative policies that came to define our later campaign. Not that the content was bad; indeed, it was full of moderate, feasible proposals to make government work better. But it needed to be reworked to appeal more to ordinary voters.¹⁵⁸

Entitled STAND UP FOR CANADA: “HONEST GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS FOR YOU,” it included distinct changes to northern defence, aboriginal affairs and industry, plus a fourth increasingly popular area of northern policy, the environment. The platform was more of a dissertation than a readable booklet, having grown in length from 15,000 to 25,000 words.

The defence section was now split into two, 10.6, National Defence, and 10.7, Defence Industrial Initiative. The National Defence section offered a detailed Arctic defence strategy for the navy, army and air force, illuminating both the responsibilities of taking care of, and the opportunities for developing Arctic defence politics and policy:

New armed military ice breakers, naval replenishment ships, a sea mine-clearing capability, an expansion of the underwater clearance and demolition unit, a new national sensor system to monitor northern waters, new transport ships, and new single-surface combatants; a new northern warfare training centre, new arctic equipment and vehicles, a ready reserve force to respond to security threats, revitalized Northern

¹⁵⁸ Tom Flanagan, *Harper's Team: Behind the Scenes in the Conservative Rise to Power* (Quebec: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007), p. 211.

Rangers, an expansion of the chemical, biological and nuclear disaster response capability, an improved humanitarian capability, replacement of logistic vehicles, additional armoured vehicles, new long-range and integral fire support systems; and a new air transport fleet, a new fleet of long-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft replacements, upgraded fighter and patrol aircraft, a transport helicopter capability, new NORAD radar capability, and northern deployment sites.¹⁵⁹

This was followed by the affordability subsection, which detailed the overall expenditure increase available under a Conservative government to accommodate such improvements, \$4.75 billion more by 2009/10 than what the Liberal government currently spent.¹⁶⁰

Harper's advisors, the platform's editors, were demonstrating their refinement approach, that northern defence could be utilized as a plateau of common ground to access the entire nation, due to its relevance to any who subscribe to conservative staples of not just sovereignty, via a structured domestic defence blueprint, but also of numeric transparency, through more comprehensible numbers and comparisons than a brief reference to achieving the European average GDP military expenditure percentage. As part of this transparency, section 10.7, Defence Industrial Initiative, concisely summarized the details that had been given in the March 2005 policy manual¹⁶¹ by saying economic stimulus potential for the Canadian economy would be initiated through supporting "small to large defence industrial enterprises in all parts of the

¹⁵⁹ Tom Flanagan, private collection, *Stand up for Canada: Honest Government that Works for You*, draft 5 (May 8 2005), pp. 71-72.

¹⁶⁰ Tom Flanagan, private collection, *Stand up for Canada: Honest Government that Works for You*, draft 5 (May 8 2005), p. 72.

¹⁶¹ Northern stimulus to national industrial productivity through shipbuilding, aerospace, electronics, and land systems. Conservative Party of Canada, *Policy Declaration* (March 19, 2005), p. 41, viii.

country,”¹⁶² reiterating the need to access the US and international allied defence procurement markets with research and development. It proposed an Eastern Arctic sovereignty patrol in Goose Bay, Labrador and an enhanced Pacific-Western Arctic sovereignty patrol in Comox, BC via “new rapid reaction Army battalions and UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) squadrons.”¹⁶³ Northern Territories operations would include “new armed military ice breakers, a new national sensor system to monitor northern waters, a new northern warfare training centre, new arctic equipment and vehicles, revitalized Northern Rangers, and northern air deployment sites.”¹⁶⁴ In total, the role of the Canadian Arctic in defence policy had gone from almost zero in 2004, to the most significant feature of an elaborate description of what the Conservative party was aiming for. It was a strategic move to achieve political support through transparent policies, including its labouriously detailed northern plan.

Defence was not the only section to be edited in the May 2005 platform. Aboriginal Affairs was now a subsection of VII, The Future of Canada’s Communities, and briefly appeared in section IX, The Future of the Federation and Democratic Reform of our Institutions. Subsection 7.5, Securing the Full Participation of Canada’s Aboriginal Peoples in Canadian Society, utilized the March policy manual’s six points, with further elaboration on the need for funding to follow aboriginal students based on parents’ selection of which school system to put their children in. It also detailed the need to adopt “‘project based management’ for major economic projects, such as mining and energy projects in northern Canada, to ensure in cases of national or provincial importance, that economic benefits are not lost to both Aboriginal and

¹⁶² Tom Flanagan, private collection, *Stand up for Canada: Honest Government that Works for You*, draft 5 (May 8 2005), p. 73.

¹⁶³ Tom Flanagan, private collection, *Stand up for Canada: Honest Government that Works for You*, draft 5 (May 8 2005), pp. 73-74.

¹⁶⁴ Tom Flanagan, private collection, *Stand up for Canada: Honest Government that Works for You*, draft 5 (May 8 2005), p. 74.

non-Aboriginal Canadians as a result of regulatory and land claim confusion.”¹⁶⁵ The need for compassionate and more economically detailed (therefore publically plausible) social policy continues in Subsection 9.9, Payments to Provinces and Territories, which describes the Conservative willingness to assist the territories with revised Territorial Financing Formula data,¹⁶⁶ offering \$13.7 million to the Yukon, \$22.5 million to the Northwest Territories and \$21.8 million to Nunavut.¹⁶⁷ The volume of Aboriginal Affairs information provided is similar to the 2004 platform, but its logic is based not only upon need to improve social conditions for Aboriginals, but also upon increasing reader awareness of opportunities in northern resources for Aboriginals as well as non-Aboriginals.

Northern industry potential is explored in sections: 4.3, Mining; 4.4, Fishing; 4.7, Energy; and 9.7, The Development of the North. Of these, Fishing, Energy and The Development of the North demonstrate major refinement in northern areas to expand both the non-mutually exclusive social and sovereignty pillars of right-wing coalition unity. Section 4.4 promises \$276 million over five years to expand the Canadian Coast Guard, 4.7 promises the Conservatives will “Work with Northerners, particularly First Nations, as well as the private sector to develop responsibly the Mackenzie Delta’s natural gas potential. [Paying attention] to how the federal government can simplify and make it more transparent.”¹⁶⁸ The most progressive of the three sections, The

¹⁶⁵ Tom Flanagan, private collection, *Stand up for Canada: Honest Government that Works for You*, draft 5 (May 8 2005), p. 50.

¹⁶⁶ “an annual unconditional transfer from the Government of Canada to the three territorial governments to enable them to provide their residents a range of public services comparable to those offered by provincial governments, at comparable levels of taxation. It helps territorial governments fund essential public services in the North, such as hospitals, schools, infrastructure and social services, and recognizes the high cost of providing public services in the North as well as the challenges the territorial governments face in providing these services to a large number of small, isolated communities.” Department of Finance, Canada, *Territorial Financing Formula*, retrieved May 10th 2010 from "<http://www.fin.gc.ca/fedprov/tff-eng.asp>" <http://www.fin.gc.ca/fedprov/tff-eng.asp>.

¹⁶⁷ Tom Flanagan, private collection, *Stand up for Canada: Honest Government that Works for You*, draft 5 (May 8 2005), p. 66.

¹⁶⁸ Tom Flanagan, private collection, *Stand up for Canada: Honest Government that Works for You*, draft 5 (May 8 2005), p. 30.

Development of the North, morphs from a simple mention of a territorial resource-revenue-sharing agreement to a full, detailed description of defence, economic and social policies. It discusses the potential roles of Canada's north to continental security; national energy and resource industry potential; economic independence via a devolution agreement date of 2007; land settlement implementation reports; Mackenzie Delta pipeline support via the External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation, a \$20 million Northern science research funding increase, a \$120 million trust fund for Northern Strategy for the territorial governments, and work with First Nations to facilitate their participation in new resource development opportunities.¹⁶⁹ All this emphasizes the north's significance as a trans-Canadian cohesive subject.

The previously undiscussed public area of interest in the unpublished May 2005 northern platform scope was in Chapter Six, the environment. The territories are described as being in need of Conservative financial support to receive beneficial technologies to reduce contaminated waste sites, air and water contamination, watershed mismanagement, poor water quality and quantity, and the number of species at risk. As an increasingly politically popular topic with all, including the right wing, this connection of northern policy to environmentalism provides another support for the social pillar. The feeling of patriotism from the March policy manual was continued in May 2005, but it was filled out with more detailed and less emotionally based content, utilizing the popular undercurrents of economic potential and validity through the platform's phenomenal attention to detail.

¹⁶⁹ Tom Flanagan, private collection, *Stand up for Canada: Honest Government that Works for You*, draft 5 (May 8 2005), p. 65.

REFINEMENT PHASE 3 – THE 2005/2006 PLATFORM

The May 2005 platform was not published, due to the fact that Stephen Harper's attempt to bring down the government failed on May 19th by one vote. This showed Paul Martin's popularity fast sliding. The Conservative preparation for the election call, though postponed for six more months, began with building a new campaign team. Dr. Tom Flanagan resigned as Campaign Manager and Doug Finley took over, responsible for campaign organization. Ian Brodie took over from Phil Murphy as Chief of Staff at the Office of the Leader of the Opposition. Mark Cameron would work with Ken Boessenkool on scripting and writing the platform. Lawrence Cannon became the Quebec Lieutenant. The secret weapon of the next campaign would be Patrick Muttart, public relations expert, enlisted to find ways to dramatize, moisten and invigorate the presentation of Conservative policy, emphasizing a new role for politics in the campaign. When the next non-confidence vote occurred on November 28th 2005, due to the first volume of the Gomery Report having just been issued,¹⁷⁰ Martin proceeded to set the election date at January 23rd, 2006. The platform, Stand Up for Canada, released on January 13th 2006, was short, concise, readable and pictorial - showing the huge leap in Conservative understanding regarding limited readership. This awareness of the potential for information saturation and public unwillingness to take more than a glance infiltrated northern policy, leaving details previously provided in platforms to be issued instead through the media and via the campaign speeches, a method Canadians would be more likely to appreciate.

¹⁷⁰ Describing the Liberal "depressing tale of greed, venality and misconduct," Paul Wells, *Right Side Up: The Fall of Paul Martin and the Rise of Stephen Harper's New Conservatism* (Toronto, Ontario: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 2006), p. 158.

The platform was broken into five succinct sections including a small defence sub-section, Defending Canada, which included a simple purpose: Canada's need to be independently capable of defending national sovereignty and security over vast territory.¹⁷¹ It contained nine short bullets, with one direct northern reference, to "increase the Canadian Forces' capacity to protect Canada's Arctic sovereignty and security,"¹⁷² on the basis that should a reader want more information, she could fall back on previous documents such as the March 2005 policy manual, the Canada First Defence Policy, or its predecessor, the Canadian Alliance Defence Platform, which contained the details from the previous platforms that had been edited out to increase readership.¹⁷³ To demonstrate the campaign's new spirit of comprehensible information, the 2006 platform simply promised improved Arctic sovereignty by increased defence spending. The spending increases that were detailed, though actually lower than those offered in preceding platforms, were given comparative to current Liberal spending.¹⁷⁴ Statistics on personnel recruitment, many of whom would be trained in Canada's north, were also lower than before.¹⁷⁵ With the focus on sovereignty, the platform content was purely Canadian, with no comparisons

¹⁷¹ Conservative Party of Canada, *Stand Up for Canada: Conservative Party of Canada Federal Election Platform* (December 2005), p. 45.

¹⁷² Conservative Party of Canada, *Stand Up for Canada: Conservative Party of Canada Federal Election Platform* (December 2005), p. 45.

¹⁷³ These details included the building of three home-made heavy icebreakers, the 500 troops for Iqualuit where a deep water port would be placed (federally funded) to boost the northern economy, an Arctic National Sensor System, an Arctic army training centre in Cambridge Bay with 100 regular force personnel capable of training army units to use new equipment like tundra troop carriers, new search-and-rescue aircraft in Yellowknife, long-range aerial vehicle (UAV) squadrons for Goose Bay (east) and Comox (west), Aurora aircraft and the satellite surveillance system upgrades, Canadian Ranger revitalization through recruitment of 500 officers, and finally provision of emergency response through a new airborne battalion at Trenton CFB, Tom Flanagan, private collection, *Stand up for Canada: Honest Government that Works for You*, draft 5 (May 8 2005), pp. 73-74.

¹⁷⁴ To a \$5.3 billion increase in spending over five years beyond the current (Liberal) projections, Conservative Party of Canada, *Stand Up for Canada: Conservative Party of Canada Federal Election Platform* (December 2005), p.45.

¹⁷⁵ A target of 75,000 members based on recruiting 13,000 more troops, Conservative Party of Canada, *Stand Up for Canada: Conservative Party of Canada Federal Election Platform* (December 2005), p. 45, as opposed to an original target of at least 80,000, Conservative Party of Canada, *Demanding Better: Conservative Party of Canada Platform 2004* (2004), p. 41.

to European GDP expenditure goals. Instead of offering a potentially overwhelming and consequently little-read document by the bulk of the coalition, as part of the 2006 campaign northern policy refinement, more details on northern defence would be broached utilizing the media through sovereignty-inspiring speeches.

The Liberal campaign struggled to maintain its public campaign and platform support due to media assertions of decade-long Liberal financial successes being attributable not to brilliant economic policy but rather to fiscal imbalance,¹⁷⁶ with continued updates on the Gomery Inquiry and the Goodale investigation, and with a platform that was based on rebuffing Conservative ideas rather than defining its own policy.¹⁷⁷ There were some strengths to the Liberal campaign, and they involved northern social politics. The Assembly of First Nations' suggested that aboriginals are best served by a Liberal government, stating "we prefer political parties that are clearly supportive of First Nations issues and have demonstrated in the past their commitment to First Nations issues."¹⁷⁸ ¹⁷⁹ Due also to parties like the NDP offering a high commitment to social spending, though often overseas, the Conservatives needed to prove their own social policy, supporting Canadian minorities like Aboriginals.¹⁸⁰ Aboriginal affairs was tackled in the Stand up for Our Communities section, offering an introductory statement promising implementation of all recommendations of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development in its fourth report on Resolving Indian

¹⁷⁶ Expense transfers to the provinces.

¹⁷⁷ "Unlike last year, the Conservatives are not on the defensive. Indeed, they are carrying the agenda," Hartley Steward, "Harper has waged the best campaign," *Whitehorse Star*, Dec 28, 2005, p. 5.

¹⁷⁸ "Assembly of First Nations suggests aboriginals best served by Liberals," *Cranbrook Daily Townsman*, Dec 8, 2005, p. 5.

¹⁷⁹ Influenced by the \$5.1-billion funding commitment given to aboriginals at the first ministers meeting in British Columbia under the current Liberal government.

¹⁸⁰ Like increasing federal spending to target the eradication of AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, "Highlights from the parties' election platforms," *Windsor Star*, Jan 21, 2006, p. D.8.

Residential School Claims, and acknowledging sixty years of inequitable treatment.¹⁸¹ The 2006 focus for social policy was justice for Aboriginal Canadians, and it continued into the subsection Opportunity and Respect for Aboriginals. Like the defence section, it was shorter and more specific, stimulating emotional interest without the explicit detail. It had a summary of the aboriginal plight, pertinent to reserve-residing Aboriginals across the nation, describing bad water, bad schools and bad housing. Its six-bullet action plan included similar points to the 2004 platform, including devolution, property ownership support, comprehensive and specific claim settlements. It also included a new point, perhaps as a counter to the Aboriginal pro Liberal persuasion, to “accept the targets agreed upon at the recent Meeting of First Ministers and National Aboriginal Leaders,”^{182 183} including for improvements for Arctic regions in housing, health, education and economic opportunities. This Arctic social welfare was an aspect of what a Conservative source refers to as Conservative campaign “positive white noise,”¹⁸⁴ letting swing voters know the kind of person Harper was.

Northern industrial potential, addressed in Stand up for Opportunity, offers minimal words on Mining, Promoting Canada’s Regions, or Fisheries. As with the 2004 platform, there is a short environmental section, but it does not discuss anything of northern relevance. Mining contains a single northern reference, to “implement the recommendations of the External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation related to mining, such as a ‘single window’ approach

¹⁸¹ Conservative Party of Canada, *Stand Up for Canada: Conservative Party of Canada Federal Election Platform* (December 2005), p. 35.

¹⁸² Conservative Party of Canada, *Stand Up for Canada: Conservative Party of Canada Federal Election Platform* (December 2005), p. 38.

¹⁸³ This was a ten year commitment to close the gap, such as by “Addressing the differing circumstances of Aboriginal peoples in all regions and communities regardless of place of residence (on reserves or settlements, in rural or urban areas, or northern and Arctic regions,)” *Measuring progress, establishing principles, and improving education, housing, health and economic opportunities, First Ministers and National Aboriginal Leaders Strengthening Relationships and Closing the Gap* (Kelowna, BC, November 24-25, 2005), p. 3. Retrieved may 10, 2010 from http://www.scics.gc.ca/cinfo05/800044004_e.pdf.

¹⁸⁴ Interview with Conservative source for thesis, January 18th, 2010.

to federal regulatory bodies in the North for the oil and gas and mining sectors,”¹⁸⁵ touting the economic opportunity in the north, and the need for currently unavailable efficient organization of information dissipation amongst government levels. Promoting Canada’s Regions issues the vague Conservative political aim to “Develop, together with northerners, both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal, a northern vision to guide economic, social, and environmental progress in the region,”¹⁸⁶ suggesting that there is opportunity for socio-economic growth in the north, without offering strategic details on how this might be accomplished. As Ian Brodie describes, “the two (northern industrial potential and northern defence) are linked in the sense there’s a Canadian patriotic, romantic ownership, stewardship and responsibility to this vast area of the country that most will never go to,”¹⁸⁷ of which, once the new Conservative government came to power, the former would begin to grow as the latter shrank, for unexpected reasons. Lastly, Fisheries gives the same discussion issued in 2004, in a more concise format, including its mention of the two hundred mile continental shelf limit, wild stock management, joint councils and elimination of bans on seal products.

There is no Northern Development section in the 2005/2006 platform, and the northern policy that is offered elsewhere in the platform is not nearly as detailed, significant or topical. Northern policy key words, like arctic, north, or defence come up far fewer times in Stand Up for Canada, Stand Up for Our Communities, and Stand Up for Opportunity than in the previous platforms. And yet, these were very much critical aspects to the coalition-unifying strategy that

¹⁸⁵ "A facility that allows parties involved in trade and transport to lodge standardized information and documents with a single entry point to fulfill all import, export, and transit-related regulatory requirements. If information is electronic then individual data elements should only be submitted once," United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (2003), *The Single Window Concept*, Retrieved May 10th 2010 from <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNECE/UNPAN019892.pdf>.

¹⁸⁶ Conservative Party of Canada, *Stand Up for Canada: Conservative Party of Canada Federal Election Platform* (December 2005), p.18.

¹⁸⁷ Interview with Ian Brodie, Chief of Staff at the Office of the Leader of the Opposition, February 5th, 2010.

made the Harper team win the 2006 election. Like the Arctic defence policy details, these concepts would be tackled in the media campaign.

REFINEMENT PHASE 3 – THE 2005/2006 OPPOSITION

Historically, the Liberals had hidden behind an effective facade of sovereignty by expressing lack of interest in cooperation with the USA in all venues, in particular with defence policy.

What made it a facade is, as described in the 2004 platform, they would be physically incapable of defending the Arctic, in particular against the Americans, just as they were incapable of forcing America to repay \$5 billion in illegally imposed tariffs on Canadian softwood lumber.

The Liberal government's Arctic defence was dependent on poorly maintained and frequently rented military equipment, usually from the Americans or Russians. Some level of cooperation was thus necessary. Still, the Liberal view of its own sovereignty was interpreted for the public via the media with displays of Paul Martin "firing nationalist rhetoric from a B.C. softwood-lumber mill..."¹⁸⁸ The Liberal 2006 defence strategy was based on the 3-D model given in April

2005-defence, diplomacy and development.¹⁸⁹ For all the dollar figures, it was old by

December; it lacked a northern, or even a domestic focus. It would also have to find a way to

build itself using equipment that had been starved of finances throughout the Martin and

Chrétien years, and with a definition of diplomacy that might be ambiguous considering the

¹⁸⁸ Campbell Clark and Gloria Galloway, "Martin Cranks up Nationalist Rhetoric," *Globe and Mail*, Dec 15, 2005, p. A1.

¹⁸⁹ Promising "\$13 billion over five years for the Canadian Forces to help buy new helicopters, planes and other equipment. Foreign aid goes up \$3.4 billion over five years, focused on disease eradication in Africa, and intervening in major world crises. Another \$1 billion is being invested in foreign diplomatic security, emergency planning and border security. Another \$650 million over five years has been earmarked for maritime and port security, and the Canada-U.S. border." "Highlights from the parties' election platforms," *Windsor Star*, Jan 21, 2006, p. D.8.

Liberals' current attitude towards the USA. As Harold J. Laski summarizes in his book *A Grammar of Politics*:

It [the state] cannot part with the control of any vital function, the scale of its armament, the right to make war, its hold on colonies and spheres of influence, its power over tariffs, currency, migration, labour conditions, because to do so is to threaten, internally, the relations of production its sovereignty exists to maintain.¹⁹⁰

The Liberals were not willing to inject financial control back into Canada's vital function of improving Arctic defence as an alternative to cooperation with the USA to which they were so ardently opposed; yet this might allow them to maintain a semblance of sovereignty in the large Arctic sphere of influence.

The Liberals made Canadian sovereignty a point of contention in their campaign, spreading rumours of Conservative pro-Americanism based on multiple allegations ranging from support for sending Canadian troops into Iraq, to refusal to stand up to Americans on the softwood lumber dispute, to support for Washington's ballistic missile defence program, to being against the Kyoto protocol. This ironically meant the Liberals were accusing the Conservatives of something they were already guilty of even if their public image said otherwise, yielding sovereignty to the Americans. This opened up Arctic sovereignty as an area of opportunity to gain voter support, which was very much needed with the Liberals leading slightly at the polls right up to the Christmas break before the election. In an interview conducted for this thesis with

¹⁹⁰ Harold J. Laski, *A Grammar of Politics* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1951), p. xxi.

Patrick Muttart, a public relations expert who was part of the 2006 Conservative campaign, Mr.

Muttart explained that

in 2004 [under] Harper, the right parties faced an absolute assault from the Liberals on our Canadian credentials. They positioned us as being alienist vis à vis Canada. The Liberal party [positioned themselves as standing] up for the Canadian identity, values, core symbols like the Charter of Rights, peacekeeping, C.B.C, and the Constitution. This was perceived as [Conservative] pro-Americanism... We believed based on our own market research there was a considerable latent pride in the Canadian Forces that hadn't been able to come to life under the liberals... People were expressing dismay at Canadian troops showing up in Afghanistan wearing green European-style gear. We believed that there was a constituency within Canada that was conservative-accessible.¹⁹¹

REFINEMENT PHASE 3 – THE 2005/2006 CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN

To access the untouched constituency of proud Canadians desiring more to be put into and more to be received from the military, the Conservative campaign defence strategy focused on regional announcements designed to be locally relevant to those listening, with an underlying pan-Canadian theme. As explained by Ian Brodie, “Mark (Cameron) and I took Gordon O'Connor and Aaron Gairdner's master complicated work (the Canadian First Defence Strategy, published in 2008) and turned it into a campaign plan, a series of local announcements. I was convinced local announcements were the way to go, so the northern piece became the fourth or fifth

¹⁹¹ Telephone interview with Patrick Muttart, former Conservative advisor, for thesis, January 29th, 2010.

piece.”¹⁹² The chosen regional announcement locations were Comox, Trenton, Halifax, Quebec and Winnipeg. Ian Brodie continued, “my role was to make sure we didn’t have a day [at one of these locations] with nothing [to say]... The Arctic [announcement] ended up in Winnipeg for convenience... The inkling was that this was potentially a very powerful piece of platform, but we had no idea when and where to do it. So it became that reserve ‘floater’ piece, to announce somewhere... We had plans up to the 21st [of December] and had stopped in Winnipeg on the 22nd to get Harper home for Christmas. Winnipeg was as far north as we would be. We didn’t have another announcement so we deployed our reserve announcement [on Arctic defence]!”¹⁹³

Ian Brodie mentioned the campaign interest in making the Arctic strategy announcement in Iqualuit, to make it more “regional,” but due to practicalities of the weather in northern Canada in December, and trying to get Harper home for December 25th, it was not possible, no matter how effective it might have been, and Winnipeg sufficed.¹⁹⁴ Interest from the press over the Winnipeg announcement was amplified significantly thanks to reports of an American nuclear submarine, the USS Charlotte, passing through Canadian waters without getting permission from or even notifying the Canadian government,¹⁹⁵ which, although not considered an assault on Canadian sovereignty by Dr. Rob Huebert due to Canada and the USA’s alliance through NATO or Norad,¹⁹⁶ still served to amplify public awareness that foreign submarines were floating around in the north and Canada lacked the capacity to spot them, never mind to keep them out.

192 Interview with Ian Brodie, Chief of Staff at the Office of the Leader of the Opposition, February 5th, 2010.

193 Interview with Ian Brodie, Chief of Staff at the Office of the Leader of the Opposition, Feb 5th 2010.

194 Interview with Ian Brodie, Chief of Staff at the Office of the Leader of the Opposition, Feb 5th 2010.

195 “The National Post reported that a U.S. nuclear submarine, USS Charlotte, cruised through the Arctic Ocean, making a Nov. 10 stop at the North Pole, following a route that likely passed through Canadian waters. It is still not clear whether the Canadian government gave permission for the U.S. sub’s voyage, although experts say it is highly unlikely,” Norma Greenway, “Tories vow to protect Arctic: \$2B plan to expand military presence,” *National Post*, Dec 23, 2005, p. A.1.

196 Rob Huebert, Ph.D, “U.S. subs do not threaten our sovereignty,” *National Post*, Dec 21st, 2005, p. A16.

To establish an underlying pan-Canadian theme, the Arctic announcement in Winnipeg was a key unifying feature. Ian Brodie stated:

[The campaign focused on] something bigger than just day to day bread and butter issues. A campaign at federal level needs to be about something more than just money, more than just tax policy. So the north was key in that it was a policy and an issue set that allowed us, distinct from the Liberals, to talk about something that though not top of mind to Canadians on a day to day basis, appealed to the sense of nationhood, nation-building, conceptions of Canada as a northern nation, and allowed us to talk about something that is part of our country and identity, it's ours, and we'll do everything to defend it, protect it and improve quality of life of those who live up there.¹⁹⁷

Harper discussed the same points in Winnipeg as those issued in section 10.6, National Defence, of the May 2005 unreleased platform with a little more detail: He discussed stationing three new Canadian-made armed naval heavy icebreakers in the area of Iqualuit with 500 regular force personnel, capable of carrying troops; building a new military/civilian deep-water docking facility in Iqualuit to house the icebreakers from federal-only funding; establishing a new Arctic National Sensor System for northern waters with underwater surveillance listening posts to detect submarines; building a new Arctic army training centre in the area of Cambridge Bay to be staffed by 100 regular force personnel capable of training army units to use new snow/tundra troop carriers and other equipment; stationing new fixed-wing search-and-rescue aircraft in Yellowknife, providing eastern and western Arctic air surveillance from Goose Bay and Comox

¹⁹⁷ Interview with Ian Brodie, Chief of Staff at the Office of the Leader of the Opposition, Feb 5th, 2010.

with 100 regular force personnel at each; upgrades to the Aurora aircraft and satellite surveillance system; revitalizing the Canadian Rangers with recruitment of up to 500 additional Rangers including equipment upgrades; and providing emergency response capability to the Arctic from CFB Trenton.¹⁹⁸

To maintain media interest in the Conservative party throughout the campaign, according to a Conservative source, “each day we released a package of materials [to] the press. It’s why we dominated the media, because we gave them material to use.”¹⁹⁹ This strategy began with taking a positive, Canadian-policy focus, not capitalizing on the Gomery Report. Maintaining a steady stream of policy-promising, politically spun press material was difficult, since the campaign was 56 days long instead of the typical 36-40, and had been expected to be in spring of 2006, not winter of 2005, leaving little time for preparation after the writ was dropped on November 28th. Harper’s speech writers had to rely heavily on existing documents such as the Canada First Northern Strategy, itself based on the Canadian Alliance Defence Platform. For the majority of the public, not interested in such policy detail, Harper’s campaign organizers, including Ian Brodie and Patrick Muttart, summarized the essence of the Northern Strategy given in Winnipeg on the 22nd for the press with statements for Harper such as: “you don’t defend national sovereignty with flags, cheap election rhetoric and advertising campaigns. You need forces on the ground, ships in the sea and proper surveillance. As prime minister I will make it plain to foreign governments, including the government of the United States, that naval vessels travelling in Canadian waters will require the consent of the government of Canada.”²⁰⁰ Ian

198 Norma Greenway, “Tories vow to protect Arctic: \$2B plan to expand military presence,” *National Post*, Dec 23, 2005, p. A.1.

199 Interview with Conservative source for thesis, January 18th, 2010.

²⁰⁰ Anonymous, “Tories vow to boost military muscle in Arctic,” *Moncton Times-transcript*, Dec 23rd, 2005 p. (no page number provided).

Brodie labeled the Arctic Strategy as a good representation of Canadian patriotism.²⁰¹ Dr. Flanagan summarized in *Harper's Team*, "he (Harper) had turned the tables on the Liberals by making himself the defender of Canada against US intrusion, doing it the Conservative way, with the 'hard power' of military units rather than the 'soft power' of rhetoric. After Winnipeg's regional announcement on the 22nd of December, anti-Americanism ceased to be a major factor in the campaign."²⁰² Admittedly, for all this northern sovereignty assertion, when questioned about what sanctions he would impose should a violator of the Northwest Passage limitations be spotted, Harper had to evade by saying that "Canada has to first be able to detect violators before it can talk about penalizing them."²⁰³ Liberal northern politics, focusing on anti-American sentiment while conveniently avoiding policy realities such as the state of the Canadian military, were losing public support.

The true genius of the Conservative 2005/2006 campaign refinement is Mr. Harper's transition from a leader often summarized as an economist "policy wonk,"²⁰⁴ fascinated with exhaustive root-to-tip evidence for policies, dispensed through platforms not campaigns, to a leader whose campaign advisors allowed him to understand and consequently utilize the same public ignorance and disinterest as the Liberals had been doing for years, but to his advantage in both northern politics and policy. Harper solidified a coalition of patriotic voters, from the west, traditional Tories, and Quebec, in 2006 by promising to inject Canadian pride into northern defence policy. He gained some public economic support with the associated stimulus for the economy. He highlighted Conservative social fundamentals for helping unemployed or

²⁰¹ Interview with Ian Brodie, Chief of Staff at the Office of the Leader of the Opposition, Feb 5th, 2010.

²⁰² Tom Flanagan, *Harper's Team: Behind the Scenes in the Conservative Rise to Power* (Quebec: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007), pp. 245-246.

²⁰³ Norma Greenway, "Tories vow to protect Arctic: \$2B plan to expand military presence," *National Post*, Dec 23, 2005, p. A.1.

²⁰⁴ Hartley Steward, "Harper has waged the best campaign," *Whitehorse Star*, Dec 28, 2005, p. 5.

financially less secure Canadians such as northerners. Harper did this by utilizing the media to connect with Canadian passion, instead of using exhaustive platforms to attempt to connect with the few who took time to read them. In taking this new campaign strategy, he also successfully smothered the Conservative problem exposed by Ian Brodie:

I just think the attacks on Martin [regarding the weakness of his northern sovereignty plans] were too much. We're not seriously going to send troops if the Americans tell us to screw off. We're going to do the same thing Mulroney did with the Polar Sea ice breaker trip.²⁰⁵

One article did pick up on this problem, in the *Globe and Mail*: "Would Mr. Harper have our armed forces fire on (an) offending ship? If he would not, he is asking us to waste \$2-billion (to build various arctic equipment including icebreakers). If he would, he is asking us to declare war on the United States. Is Mr. Harper quite sane?"²⁰⁶ Fortunately, that was the extent of the analysis from the media. Perhaps Dr. Flanagan got it wrong. Perhaps it was not offering the "hard power of military units" that won the election after all; perhaps it was utilizing, in conjunction with public disinterest in policy, the soft power of Liberal politics in combination with public apathy. Either way, it worked. When military experts called the Conservative plan "ambitious but do-able,"²⁰⁷ the public didn't recognize that it was not military experts' opinions that mattered, for it is fiscal policy which ultimately dictates defence, economic and social policy

²⁰⁵ Dec 21, 5/7, Email to Mark Cameron, Ken Boessenkool, Tom Flanagan, Subject: Winnipeg speech, Wed 12/21/2005, 12:39pm.

²⁰⁶ Michael Feld, "Cold logic, *Globe and Mail*," December 24th 2005, p. A.16.

²⁰⁷ Norma Greenway, "Tories vow to protect Arctic: \$2B plan to expand military presence," *National Post*, Dec 23, 2005, p. A.1.

in all regions. Unless Mr. Harper could somehow multiply the dollars and population by a factor of ten, even with strategic utilitarianism, efficiency, and a Masters in Economics, he was bound by similar restrictions to the Liberals. Of course, Mr. Harper is an economist, so he knew this already.

CONCLUSION

Between the failure of the 2004 campaign and the May 2005 unreleased platform, strategic utilization of northern politics and policies had followed a progression, offering more and more detail, until, with the help of people-experts such as Patrick Muttart, the concepts of information-saturation and utilizing public ignorance to one's advantage were finally grasped. In all probability, the latter tactics were also realized by Diefenbaker with his transcending sense of national purpose, and New Frontier Policy. The 2006 platform cut back dramatically on quantity, and offered fundamentals appropriately detailed to prove a higher degree of opportunity in the north than the Liberals were offering. It did this while conveniently avoiding the realities of northern sovereignty with respect to Canada's military budget in comparison to her neighbour to the south, and their implications on other areas of policy which would need monetary support also. For non-policy experts, as most voters are, demonstrations of the popular concerns of sovereign defence, with a little economic opportunity and social welfare thrown in, were an ideal combination.

The campaign had a concise, empowering, and opportunistic "real policy," with a new awareness of the social needs of northerners. It also had a new image: it used northern politics to brand the Conservative Party. Instead of volleying Liberal accusations of being a pawn party of

the USA, of being non-reflective of Canadian values and colours,²⁰⁸ and of being insignificant in historical events,²⁰⁹ thanks to Harper's campaign team, the 2006 Conservative brand established itself as a party uniquely definitive of Canadian sovereignty via an area of land that is relevant to all Canadians by accessing powerful emotional instincts like pride, hope and duty. The 2006 Conservative Party would be one representative of Canadian patriotism, through capacity for self-defence, allusions of future economic potential and recognition of human needs north of 60 degrees.

²⁰⁸ The red and white national flag matches the Liberal party colours, not the Conservative.

²⁰⁹ For instance, the Constitution was signed under Liberal Prime Minister Trudeau.

CHAPTER 3: IMPLEMENTING CAMPAIGN PROMISES POST 2006

INTRODUCTION

As Chapter II demonstrates, Stephen Harper arranged his 2006 campaign similarly to Diefenbaker in terms of creating a political vision of empowerment and opportunity through northern Canada, amplified by vagueness and public ignorance, for the purpose of building a coalition of support. Diefenbaker's had been focused on achieving a transcending sense of national purpose, using the north in place of the west, conveniently not addressing the costs of doing so for already cash-strapped Canadians. Harper's had been about focusing on strengthening northern sovereignty and to a lesser extent stewardship, downplaying concerns about the cost of, or implications towards USA relations. As mentioned in Chapter I, with the exception of investing into Roads to Resources and upgrading the DEW Line, Diefenbaker failed to implement those northern sovereignty visions once elected, mostly due to the financial cost. The other of Harper's predecessors examined in Chapter I, Mulroney, did not build a campaign on northern promises like Harper or Diefenbaker, instead structuring his campaigns around decentralization of power, giving Quebec cultural recognition via the Meech Lake Accord. He did, however, help to maintain his coalition of support when in power by implementing select northern policies relevant to events at the time, such as declaring the Northwest Passage as internal water and giving the US Polar Sea icebreaker the right to pass through it when the problem occurred. To decide whether or not Harper implemented his 2006 campaign northern promises, and gauge to what degree he implemented northern policies besides those from the campaign, it is necessary to review the policies implemented by the new Conservative

government relating to the north between 2006 and the present.

CAMPAIGN 2006 ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY GOALS IMPLEMENTED UNDER DEFENCE MINISTER O'CONNOR

Besides the December 22nd, 2005 Winnipeg speech describing the specifics of the new Conservative Arctic defence plan, such as new icebreakers, personnel and training centres, the 2006 campaign also contained two broad goals regarding the Conservative government's vision for the north, based on similar abstract goals as Meryll Menzies' renewal of the Frontier Spirit for the campaign of Diefenbaker. They included a vague declaration of Canada's need to be independently capable of defending national sovereignty and security over its vast territory,²¹⁰ and of needing to increase the Canadian Forces' capacity to protect Canada's Arctic.²¹¹ However, they did not specify against whom, under what conditions, and at the expense of which other Federal programmes. In the year and a half under Gordon O'Connor as Defence Minister, many of the projects used to achieve these elusive promises to "improve" and "increase" actually came down to continuations of projects begun under the previous Liberal government. When asked to describe a Liberal Arctic strategy of which these projects could be considered a part for this interview, former Chief of Defence Staff General Rick Hillier's response was "nothing. There is nothing to say because there was no unifying strategy."²¹² There were only a few Arctic projects, and they lacked a theme or strategic goal. In 2006 these included: Norad Arctic training, training with US and Canadian forces to recognize unidentified aircraft approaching North America; Narwhal's Operation Lancaster, training for Canadian forces to operate

²¹⁰ Conservative Party of Canada, *Stand Up for Canada: Conservative Party of Canada Federal Election Platform* (December 2005), p. 45.

²¹¹ Conservative Party of Canada, *Stand Up for Canada: Conservative Party of Canada Federal Election Platform* (December 2005), p. 45.

²¹² Interview with former Chief of Defence Staff General Rick Hillier for thesis, May 21st, 2010.

cohesively with each other in the northern environment; and the SIRIUS acquisition, a long-range infrared search and track system for installation on the Canadian Navy's Halifax Class Frigates. The first vehicle to be outfitted with a SIRIUS radar was a CP-140 Aurora aircraft in 2005 as part of Canada's contribution to Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR in Italy, the same aircraft which could be used for Arctic air patrols. Another continuation of Liberal northern sovereignty policy was the launch of RADARSAT 2, a replacement satellite for RADARSAT 1, which was launched in 1995 and originally intended for a five year term.²¹³ The purpose of RADARSAT 2, launched in December from Kazakhstan, was described by Colin Carrie, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Industry at the time, Jim Prentice, as being to "help us vigorously protect our Arctic sovereignty as international interest in the region increases."²¹⁴ The product of a public-private partnership, the satellite offered highly specialized remote-sensing technologies and applications to monitor foreign activity including in the Arctic.

By 2007, two Arctic sovereignty operations occurred which were part of the 2006 platform promise "to increase Canadian Forces' capacity to protect Canada's Arctic sovereignty and security,"²¹⁵ Nunaliut and Nanook. Nunaliut occurred between March 24th and April 14th in the Northern Arctic Archipelago, and constituted a 24-member patrol of Regular Forces and Canadian Rangers who travelled close to 8,000 kilometres. Nunaliut translates to "land that is ours," and O'Connor described it by saying "All participants in the patrol are helping to ensure

²¹³ Government of Canada (2003), *RADARSAT-1 Celebrating Eight Productive Years in Space*. Retrieved March 2010 from <http://news.gc.ca/web/article-eng.do?crtr.sj1D=&mthd=advSrch&crtr.mnthndVI=3&nid=13069&crtr.dpt1D=&crtr.tp1D=&crtr.lc1D=&crtr.yrStrtVI=2002&crtr.kw=radarsat%2B1&crtr.dyStrtVI=26&crtr.aud1D=&crtr.mnthStrtVI=2&crtr.yrndVI=2010&crtr.dyndVI=9>.

²¹⁴ Government of Canada (2007), *Successful launch of RADARSAT-2*. Retrieved March 2010 from <http://news.gc.ca/web/article-eng.do?crtr.sj1D=&mthd=advSrch&crtr.mnthndVI=3&nid=368059&crtr.dpt1D=&crtr.tp1D=&crtr.lc1D=&crtr.yrStrtVI=2002&crtr.kw=radarsat%2B2%2Band%2Bcolin&crtr.dyStrtVI=26&crtr.aud1D=&crtr.mnthStrtVI=2&crtr.yrndVI=2010&crtr.dyndVI=9>.

²¹⁵ Conservative Party of Canada, *Stand Up for Canada: Conservative Party of Canada Federal Election Platform* (December 2005), p. 45.

that Canada remains the true north, strong and free.”²¹⁶ Nanook was the largest military sovereignty demonstration in the Arctic in 2007, from August 7-17th. It was held in the Baffin Island Coastal and Hudson Strait areas, involving approximately 600 soldiers, sailors and air force personnel along with the Canadian Coast Guard and RCMP. Described as “to protect and defend Canadian sovereignty in Canada’s north while enhancing inter-agency coordination and communication,” it included two exercise scenarios including a drug interdiction event and a request for assistance with an environmental protection event.²¹⁷ Both events were about re-establishing Canada’s defence footprint in the north, as Mulroney had done with his response to the Polar Sea problem, though Nanook was begun under Chretien in 2002.

Of the specific campaign promises that united Harper’s coalition in 2006 and got him elected, arguably the most significant overall relating to north of the 60th parallel, due to its concrete nature, was his promise for increased military spending: As stated in the platform and in public speeches, Harper offered a \$5.3 billion increase in spending over five years for the entire Canadian Forces, which would include financing 75,000 Canadian Forces troops.²¹⁸ The Minister of Defence, Gordon O’Connor, was the same man who created the Canada First Sovereignty Plan, published in 2008 but written prior to the 2006 campaign. Being the author, he knew the money needed to implement Canada First, including its northern aspects: \$15 to \$20

²¹⁶ Government of Canada (2007), *Canada's New Government Praises Canadian Forces Arctic Sovereignty Patrol*. Retrieved March 2010 from <http://news.gc.ca/web/article-eng.do?crtr.sj1D=&mthd=advSrch&crtr.mnthndVI=3&nid=285799&crtr.dpt1D=&crtr.tp1D=&crtr.lc1D=&crtr.yrStrtVI=2007&crtr.kw=Nunalivut&crtr.dyStrtVI=26&crtr.aud1D=&crtr.mnthStrtVI=1&crtr.yrndVI=2008&crtr.dyndVI=9>.

²¹⁷ Government of Canada (2007), *Canadian Forces Conduct Eastern Arctic Operation*. Retrieved March 2010 from <http://news.gc.ca/web/article-eng.do?crtr.sj1D=&mthd=advSrch&crtr.mnthndVI=3&nid=343959&crtr.dpt1D=&crtr.tp1D=&crtr.lc1D=&crtr.yrStrtVI=2007&crtr.kw=nanook%2Band%2Bdrug&crtr.dyStrtVI=26&crtr.aud1D=&crtr.mnthStrtVI=1&crtr.yrndVI=2008&crtr.dyndVI=9>.

²¹⁸ Conservative Party of Canada, *Stand Up for Canada: Conservative Party of Canada Federal Election Platform* (December 2005), p. 45.

billion, based on \$5 billion per year,²¹⁹ quite optimistic in comparison to the 2005 Liberal Defence budget which promised \$12.8 billion over five years. As discussed in Chapter II, the expenditures from the \$15 to \$20 billion total that would be allotted for Arctic defence, besides being to increase the Canadian Forces' capacity to protect Canada's Arctic sovereignty and security, were to subsidize three home-made heavy icebreakers; 500 troops for Iqualuit; a deep water port; a sensor system; an army training centre for Cambridge Bay with 100 regular personnel; training to use new equipment like tundra troop carriers and search and rescue aircraft; UAV squadrons; maintenance of Aurora aircraft; satellite system upgrades and an emergency response airborne battalion to be stationed in Trenton; and Ranger revitalization.²²⁰ General Rick Hillier was unable to give an estimate of the cost of implementing all these campaign promises, but to give a ballpark figure, he gave the cost of purchasing one heavy-duty icebreaker to be about \$1 billion.²²¹

To fund the Arctic defence spending strategies, O'Connor had envisioned getting \$1 billion in the first year, increasing in \$1 billion increments every year to total \$15 billion in five years,²²² but what he was allotted by the minister of finance was \$5 billion over five years.²²³ In the 2007 budget, this would be accelerated to \$3.1 billion in the subsequent three years. This put the Canadian Forces in the situation right from the beginning of the new Conservative government of having a thorough plan to implement, world wide, but a distinct monetary shortage with which to do it. The only campaign-promised Arctic item actually provided under

²¹⁹ General Rick Hillier, *A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War* (Toronto, Ont: Harper Collins: 2009), p. 401.

²²⁰ Conservative Party of Canada, *Stand Up for Canada: Conservative Party of Canada Federal Election Platform* (December 2005), p. 45.

²²¹ Interview with General Rick Hillier, May 21st, 2010.

²²² General Rick Hillier, *A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War* (Toronto, Ont: Harper Collins, 2009), p. 401.

²²³ General Rick Hillier, *A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War* (Toronto, Ont: Harper Collins, 2009), p. 401.

O'Connor would take place in Budget 2007. Funding of \$324 million was provided for the procurement, operation and maintenance of an additional six new large vessels including four mid-shore patrol vessels in support of the Canadian Coast Guard's large-vessel fleet requirements. This action was relevant to the 2006 platform's promise to "establish the Canadian Coast Guard as a stand-alone agency and honour the plans to invest \$276 million over five years in expanding and updating the Coast Guard fleet."²²⁴ Beyond this, the uncertainty continued regarding how highly the expensive strategy for sovereignty in the Arctic could rank on the financial priorities list, and how much value added these Arctic investments could be expected to provide to Canadian sovereignty overall, in comparison to spending that same money in other areas of the Defence budget that were in desperate need of cash.

In the years of 2006-2010, the dominant issue for Canadian Defence under the new Conservative government was not of an Arctic nature, nor was it even domestic. The issue was Afghanistan. Canada had soldiers and resources invested in Afghanistan, and was in a perpetual state of shortage for both. In his book, *A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War*, General Rick Hillier discusses what was allotted to the Canadian Forces, and how it was decided that this money would be spent. "We needed new recruits in large numbers. I reached out a lot through public appearances and the media because the Canadian Forces had to connect with Canadians and our own people in uniform, and tell them about our transformation and our missions, in particular the one in Afghanistan."²²⁵ These troops had to be financed, and as Rick Hillier explains, "the new money could pay for the desired increase in personnel up to 75,000,

²²⁴ Conservative Party of Canada, *Stand Up for Canada: Conservative Party of Canada Federal Election Platform* (December 2005), p. 26.

²²⁵ General Rick Hillier, *A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War* (Toronto, Ont: Harper Collins, 2009), p. 402.

but nothing else.”²²⁶ Needed resources quickly became known as the “Big 5,” and referred to four C-17 transport jets, sixteen C-130J Hercules strategic airlift planes, new transport helicopters, new trucks for the army, and fuel tankers to refuel the fleet at sea.²²⁷ O’Connor managed to achieve Cabinet approval for all of these items, and budget 2006 included an acceleration of the recruitment of 13,000 additional regular forces and 10,000 reserve personnel. However, these successes meant his quota for both financial support and for new parliamentary motions were far exceeded, leaving nothing, besides the \$324 million for the Coast Guard patrol vessels, for any other 2006 campaign northern promises such as icebreakers or emergency response battalions.

ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY ASPIRATIONS FROM CAMPAIGN 2006 THAT WERE POSTPONED UNDER DEFENCE MINISTER O’CONNOR

Expectations of seeing completion of many projects from amongst the various 2006 campaign promises under the remainder of Defence Minister Gordon O’Conner’s term would be fairly unrealistic since not only was the Department of Defence financially strapped during this period, but he also left his position in August of 2007, only about 18 months after the Conservative government came to power. However, it is interesting to examine the northern sovereignty goals issued by O’Connor, until his resignation, which came in the form of promises for the future rather than actions for the present, to understand where he foresaw the government spending the money, should it materialize.

O’Connor stated Canada would acquire up to eight Polar Class 5 Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships, at a cost of \$3.1 billion, providing another \$4.3 billion for operations and maintenance

²²⁶ General Rick Hillier, *A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War* (Toronto, Ont: Harper Collins, 2009), p. 401.

²²⁷ General Rick Hillier, *A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War* (Toronto, Ont: Harper Collins, 2009), p. 406.

over their 25 year lifespan, targeted for 2013, instead of building the originally promised three naval icebreakers.²²⁸ Another referral was given towards the building of a deep water port in Nunavik, later budgeted at \$48 million,²²⁹ to allow these patrol ships to resupply and refuel. The Prime Minister personally visited the Arctic every year from 2006-2010. In the first year he gave an address to the Canadian Forces and Environment Canada personnel at CFS Alert, stating “CFS Alert is important to the Government of Canada because it plays a key part in enabling us to assert this country’s Arctic sovereignty. Sovereignty over one’s territory is not a theoretical concept, and this Government is committed to defending it.”²³⁰ Though he included reprised campaign promises of a new Arctic training centre, increased Arctic surveillance and revitalization of the Rangers, no further details were provided concerning how these or any of the aforementioned projects could be afforded, and nothing else would occur towards these goals under Gordon O’Connor.

TRANSITIONING THE NORTHERN SOVEREIGNTY STRATEGY UNDER DEFENCE MINISTER O’CONNOR

Though briefly discussed in the platform of 2006, the idea of using economic opportunity and social stewardship to strengthen the Canadian northern footprint, investing further into northern

²²⁸ Government of Canada (2007), *Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships*. Retrieved May 10th 2010 from <http://news.gc.ca/web/article-eng.do?crtr.sj1D=&mthd=advSrch&crtr.mnthndVl=3&nid=336389&crtr.dpt1D=&crtr.tp1D=&crtr.lc1D=&crtr.yrStrtVl=2007&crtr.kw=patrol%2Bships&crtr.dyStrtVl=26&crtr.aud1D=&crtr.mnthStrtVl=1&crtr.yrndVl=2008&crtr.dyndVl=9>.

²²⁹ Government of Canada (2007), *Notes for an address by the Honourable Chuck Strahl, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Métis and Non-status Indians, to the Northern Development Ministers' Forum Dynamic North*. Retrieved March 2010 from <http://news.gc.ca/web/article-eng.do?crtr.sj1D=&mthd=advSrch&crtr.mnthndVl=3&nid=363219&crtr.dpt1D=&crtr.tp1D=&crtr.lc1D=&crtr.yrStrtVl=2007&crtr.kw=deep%2Bwater%2Bport%2B%252448&crtr.dyStrtVl=26&crtr.aud1D=&crtr.mnthStrtVl=1&crtr.yrndVl=2008&crtr.dyndVl=9>.

²³⁰ Government of Canada. (2006). *The Call of the North - Address by the Prime Minister Stephen Harper*. Retrieved March 2010 from <http://news.gc.ca/web/article-eng.do?crtr.sj1D=&mthd=advSrch&crtr.mnthndVl=3&nid=234499&crtr.dpt1D=&crtr.tp1D=&crtr.lc1D=&crtr.yrStrtVl=2006&crtr.kw=Alert%2BHarper%2Bspeech&crtr.dyStrtVl=26&crtr.aud1D=&crtr.mnthStrtVl=1&crtr.yrndVl=2008&crtr.dyndVl=9>.

industry yet showing a greater responsibility to improve the quality of life of northern resident, had not taken off with the press to the same degree as amplifying northern defence, so was not a focus in the 2006 campaign. However, once the new Conservative government was in power, recognition that to increase Canada's capacity to protect its Arctic sovereignty and security was not only worthwhile, but would require more than just a larger presence of Canadian Forces began to grow. It is described by Ian Brodie in his interview:

There is a patriotic, romantic, pan-Canadian ownership and stewardship, a responsibility, to this vast area of the country that most will never go to. The defence piece grabbed peoples' attention with sovereignty. The more we talked about it, the bigger prospects became. [Later, however,] there was a transition from sovereignty and defence, hard politics, to a richer approach that included an awareness of the economic development potential. And, in the last two years it has also included social potential.²³¹

Conservative sovereignty initiatives for "stewardship,"²³² a term that was initially coined by Franklyn Griffiths, professor emeritus in the department of Political Science at the University of Toronto,²³³ began in spring of 2006: Natural Resources Canada and The Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland conducted a joint initiative of surveys in northern boundary waters. The project, which was initiated under the previous Liberal government, was carried out from CFS Alert, on Ellesmere Island to determine if the Lomonosov Ridge meets UNCLOS

²³¹ Interview with Ian Brodie, Chief of Staff at the Office of the Leader of the Opposition, February 5th, 2010.

²³² As described by Brodie. Interview with Ian Brodie, Chief of Staff at the Office of the Leader of the Opposition, February 5th, 2010.

²³³ Words and deeds: Current news in the field of property law (2006), *Web Exclusive Comment by Paul Kaludjak, President of Nunavut Tunngavik Inc.*, retrieved January 24, 2011 from http://www.lawlibrary.co.za/notice/wordsanddeeds/2006/2006_11_18.htm

requirements for an extension of the North American Continental Shelf.²³⁴ In August of 2006, a \$2 million contract was awarded to Fugro Jacques GeoSurveys Inc. of Newfoundland and Labrador to identify the outer edge of the continental shelf. Making improvements to aerial surveillance to increase marine protection started in August of 2006 by introducing regularly dedicated flights over Canada's Arctic waters to locate and consequently take action against ships secreting illegal discharges. 2007-2008 was the International Polar Year, to which the Canadian government contributed \$150 million towards various Arctic science and research projects.²³⁵ In the summer of 2007, the Canadian Coast Guard Icebreaker Amundsen was dispatched on a 15 month scientific mission into the Arctic with substantial funding from the new government of \$18.1 million.²³⁶ The Amundsen would spend time in the Northwest Passage to increase its public recognition as Canadian water. The Louis St. Laurent icebreaker was used in a similar fashion, to conduct northern survey work and demonstrate Canadian presence. The 2007 Budget also offered \$39 million over the subsequent two years towards the Department of Fisheries and Oceans as part of sustaining Canada's fisheries, including those north of the sixtieth parallel, to strengthen fisheries management and resource conservation for the benefit of fishermen and women.²³⁷ Verbal governmental support was also offered for seal hunting,

²³⁴ Government of Canada (2006), *Canada's New Government Moves Forward to Establish Limits of Our Continental Shelf*. Retrieved March 23rd 2010 from <http://news.gc.ca/web/article-eng.do?crtr.sj1D=&mthd=advSrch&crtr.mnthndVl=3&nid=228619&crtr.dpt1D=&crtr.tp1D=&crtr.lc1D=&crtr.yrStrtVl=2006&crtr.kw=denmark%2Band%2Blomono sov&crtr.dyStrtVl=26&crtr.aud1D=&crtr.mnthStrtVl=1&crtr.yrndVl=2007&crtr.dyndVl=9>.

²³⁵ Government of Canada (2007), *Canada's New Government makes \$150 million commitment to International Polar Year 2007-2008*. Retrieved March 2010 from <http://news.gc.ca/web/article-eng.do?crtr.sj1D=&mthd=advSrch&crtr.mnthndVl=3&nid=279939&crtr.dpt1D=&crtr.tp1D=&crtr.lc1D=&crtr.yrStrtVl=2007&crtr.kw=International%2Band%2BPolar%2Band%2BYear%2Band%2B%2524150%2Bmillion&crtr.dyStrtVl=26&crtr.aud1D=&crtr.mnthStrtVl=1&crtr.yrndVl=2008&crtr.dyndVl=9>.

²³⁶ Government of Canada (2007), *International Polar Year - Canadian Coast Guard icebreaker Amundsen charts 15-month scientific mission in Canada's Arctic*. Retrieved March 2010 from <http://news.gc.ca/web/article-eng.do?crtr.sj1D=&mthd=advSrch&crtr.mnthndVl=3&nid=342219&crtr.dpt1D=&crtr.tp1D=&crtr.lc1D=&crtr.yrStrtVl=2007&crtr.kw=amundsen&crtr.dyStrtVl=26&crtr.aud1D=&crtr.mnthStrtVl=2&crtr.yrndVl=2008&crtr.dyndVl=9>.

²³⁷ Government of Canada (2007), *Budget Chapter 3/A Better Canada/Investments in Fisheries Science Research*. Retrieved March 2010 from <http://www.budget.gc.ca/2007/plan/bpc3-eng.html#fisheries>.

helping to brand a Canadian identity that includes northerners who have for many years made their livings off the seals, thus including the territory in which they do this, the north, within Canadian sovereign land.

SUMMARY OF DEFENCE MINISTER O'CONNOR'S TERM

Arctic strategic measures, such as procuring icebreakers or offshore patrol ships, were not immediate needs in the way that the Big 5 were for troops in Afghanistan, which, even though urgently needed, had not all been delivered by 2010 due to stretched finances. The Minister of Defence had used up his budget to finance Afghanistan, leaving nothing for the grand Arctic defensive projects. After stating that O'Connor "wanted to move Arctic pieces in various methods with the Big 5 [in Parliament], but the need for [the Big 5, from Parliament's perspective] was greater," General Rick Hillier explained that from his point of view, though not that of Gordon O'Connor, financial shortage due to the cost of the Big 5 was only a part the reason that the Conservative Arctic campaign plans did not come to fruition. "They were simply ideas that hadn't gone through gristle and mill of logic being upheld. We did go through that and the logic fell to pieces, so the willingness to put billions towards it fell apart too." He continued his summary of the Conservative campaign Arctic promises by saying:

It quickly became evident this was a quick idea military proposal in a leg of a strategy, but the rest of the strategy did not exist. In short, there was no northern strategy. There were tactical military pieces discussed [such as strengthening the Rangers, acquiring three heavy-duty Icebreakers et cetera], which got people's attention because they were big

ticket items. [However,] no strategy for the north showed how Canada would wrap its arms around this massive part of our country where [only] 50 000 people live, and [about which] most folks know nothing. [In the Conservative campaign's Arctic strategy,] no strategy [was provided describing how] we are going to develop it economically to connect the people up there to rest of Canada, how we would maintain oversight of it and engender the economic/industrial/social lives up there, then have a part be played by police, coast guard and Canadian forces.²³⁸

Several interesting non-defence projects began under Minister O'Connor, however, that indicated a governmental recognition that sovereignty could be supported by something other than the defence pillar. In August of 2007, a change occurred which would affect this situation, and this was the Cabinet shuffle that allowed Minister of Defence Gordon O'Connor to resign, and for Peter MacKay to assume the new position as Minister of Defence.

BRINGING IN A NEW DEFENCE MINISTER

Prime Minister Harper decided to continue the Afghanistan mission into 2011 for several reasons. On an international level, amongst other things, expensive though the mission was, Harper needed to continue asserting a positive relationship with the USA. This had been damaged thanks to Canada's "free-rider status" under preceding Liberal governments, who, though supportive of Afghanistan themselves, had reduced overall Canadian North American defence spending; declining to participate cost-free in continental missile defence; and who were disinterested in redesigning the 1958 NORAD agreement from an integrated tactical warning and attack assessment into a larger bi-national command. As popular as it might be amongst

²³⁸ Interview with General Rick Hillier, May 21st, 2010.

Canadians to assert independence from the USA, the relationship is critical to Canada's financial stability in many ways, including the US representing more than 80% of Canada's export market.²³⁹ Unfortunately, continuing the Afghanistan mission indefinitely, or at least until the US lost interest in it, with the resulting drain on the defence budget, also risked potential loss of coalition support. As a solution, bringing in a new, enthusiastic and yet-to-be-tarnished minister from Atlantic Canada to replace Gordon O'Connor as Minister of Defence was quite significant. He offered potential to strengthen Harper's coalition, increasing the support for the Afghanistan mission and public desire to maintain a strong relationship with the USA, by increasing support from an area that was generally weak, the Maritimes, being from Nova Scotia himself. Peter MacKay took over as Minister of Defence in August 2007 in the Cabinet shuffle. Maintaining support for Afghanistan was needed to continue to repair overall defence relations with the USA, but by late 2007, the need for North American congeniality was also spreading into a new area, the rapidly growing issue of the Arctic and defining Norad's role there.

CAMPAIGN 2006 ARCTIC DEFENCE GOALS IMPLEMENTED UNDER DEFENCE MINISTER MACKAY

Though the October 16th, 2007 Throne Speech clearly explained Prime Minister Harper's continuing plan to increase northern surveillance and patrols,²⁴⁰ with the northern defence budget still limited due to its secondary ranking in the priorities list, the Conservative party's capacity to transform northern sovereignty under the new minister, Peter MacKay, remained extremely limited. In 2008, MacKay began the expansion of the Junior Rangers, 500 youth by 2013 with

²³⁹US Department of Commerce (2001-2010), *Canada-US Trade Relationship*. Retrieved April 23, 2010 from http://www.buyusa.gov/harrisburg/can_ustrade.html.

²⁴⁰ "New Arctic patrol ships and expanded aerial surveillance will guard Canada's Far North and the Northwest Passage," Mr. Harper said. "As well, the size and capabilities of the Arctic Rangers will be expanded to better patrol our vast Arctic territory." *The Canadian Press (2007), Text of Gov. Gen. Michaëlle Jean's speech from the throne, Ottawa, Oct. 16 2007*. Retrieved April 6, 2010 from [http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20071016/thronespeech_SIDEBARS_071016/](http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20071016/thronespeech_SIDEBARS_071016/20071016/).

an investment of \$3.6 million.²⁴¹ The military purchased ten structural life extension wing kits to renew the aging CP-140 Auroras, “to prevent gaps in the military’s ability to keep watch over the country’s coast lines and the Arctic.”²⁴² The contract to build these extension kits for \$156 million US was awarded to Lockheed Martin under industrial and regional benefits, meaning that 100% of the contract value must be invested in the Canadian economy by Lockheed Martin, dollar for dollar.²⁴³ The 2008 budget also secured \$720 million towards the procurement of one of the polar class icebreakers promised back in the 2006 campaign, though the initial promise had actually been for three such icebreakers.²⁴⁴

A key part of implementing the northern defence plan outlined in the 2007 Throne Speech began in the summer of 2008 as part of the Northern Watch program, with the installation of underwater listening devices and land-based sensors on Devon Island to track ships and submarines passing through the eastern entrance to the Northwest Passage.²⁴⁵ As described by Captain Glen Gullison, from the Canadian military’s Acoustic Data Analysis Centre in Halifax, “it’s become a real cat-and-mouse game, actually, submarines keep trying to improve their noise-quieting technology, and we try to improve our listening technology to stay ahead. It’s a constant challenge.”²⁴⁶ Like this technology, in 2009 other actions were taken that

²⁴¹ Government of Canada (2008), *Minister MacKay Announces Support for Junior Canadian Rangers*. Retrieved March 2010 from <http://news.gc.ca/web/article-eng.do?crtr.sj1D=&mthd=advSrch&crtr.mnthndVI=3&nid=415839&crtr.dpt1D=&crtr.tp1D=&crtr.lc1D=&crtr.yrStrtVI=2007&crtr.kw=junior%2Band%2Brangers&crtr.dyStrtVI=26&crtr.aud1D=&crtr.mnthStrtVI=1&crtr.yrndVI=2009&crtr.dyndVI=9>.

²⁴² David Pugliese. “MacKay eyes upgrades; Analysts urge replacement of vital surveillance planes,” *Windsor Star*, Dec 26, 2007, p. B.1.

²⁴³ Government of Canada (2008), *Canadian Forces and economy get boost from contract to upgrade military aircraft*. Retrieved March 2010 from <http://news.gc.ca/web/article-eng.do?crtr.sj1D=&mthd=advSrch&crtr.mnthndVI=3&nid=424219&crtr.dpt1D=&crtr.tp1D=&crtr.lc1D=&crtr.yrStrtVI=2008&crtr.kw=aurora%2Band%2Bwing%2Band%2Bkits&crtr.dyStrtVI=26&crtr.aud1D=&crtr.mnthStrtVI=2&crtr.yrndVI=2010&crtr.dyndVI=9>.

²⁴⁴ Government of Canada (2008), *Budget Chapter 4/Protecting and Securing Canada’s Sovereignty*. Retrieved March 10, 2010 from <http://www.budget.gc.ca/2008/plan/chap4a-eng.html#sovereignty>.

²⁴⁵ CBC News (July 24, 2009), *Northwest Passage surveillance study halted*. Retrieved June 3rd, 2010, from <http://byers.typepad.com/arctic/underwater-surveillance/>.

²⁴⁶ Michael Byers, “Re-packaging Arctic sovereignty,” *Ottawa Citizen*, August 5, 2009, p. A.11.

were extensions of the 2006 campaign's goal to increase the Canadian Forces' ability to protect the north: Two autonomous underwater vehicles were delivered. These vehicles would be used by scientists with Natural Resources Canada's UNCLOS program to map the Arctic seabed in order to establish the limits of Canada's extended continental shelf.²⁴⁷ Another 2009 new equipment initiative was the issuing of a design contract for building the Nanisivik Naval Facility.²⁴⁸

FUTURE GOALS FOR ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY BY DEFENCE MINISTER MACKAY

The 2008 campaign and the following two budgets were significantly more vague and future-orientated regarding northern policy than the 2006 predecessor and next two budgets, though ultimately, few of the 2006 goals had actually been implemented in the interim. The 2008 platform asserted Canada's sovereignty in Arctic waters by reiterating the Canada First Defence Strategy's general aim: to rebuild the Canadian Forces, to provide required equipment to the Forces, and to provide predictable growth for Canada's defence budget.²⁴⁹ Though there were more detailed defence and stewardship policy goals, such as requiring mandatory notification from any foreign vessels entering Canadian territorial waters²⁵⁰ and amending the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act to extend our jurisdiction over polluting vessels to the edge of Canada's

²⁴⁷ Government of Canada (2009), *Ceremony to Hand Over Autonomous Underwater Vehicles to Government of Canada*. Retrieved March 30th from <http://news.gc.ca/web/article-eng.do?ctr.sj1D=&methd=advSrch&ctr.mnthndVI=3&nid=483749&ctr.dpt1D=&ctr.tp1D=&ctr.lc1D=&ctr.yrStrtVI=2006&ctr.kw=autonomous%2Bunderwater&ctr.dyStrtVI=26&ctr.aud1D=&ctr.mnthStrtVI=2&ctr.yrmdVI=2010&ctr.dyndVI=10>.

²⁴⁸ Government of Canada (2009), *Canada's Government Awards Contract for Arctic Infrastructure Project*. Retrieved March 30th 2010 from <http://news.gc.ca/web/article-eng.do?ctr.sj1D=&methd=advSrch&ctr.mnthndVI=3&nid=498549&ctr.dpt1D=&ctr.tp1D=&ctr.lc1D=&ctr.yrStrtVI=2008&ctr.kw=Nanisivik%2Band%2BNaval%2B&ctr.dyStrtVI=26&ctr.aud1D=&ctr.mnthStrtVI=2&ctr.yrmdVI=2010&ctr.dyndVI=10>.

²⁴⁹ Conservative Party of Canada, *The True North Strong and Free: Stephen Harper's Plan for Canadians* (2008), p. 29.

²⁵⁰ Conservative Party of Canada, *The True North Strong and Free: Stephen Harper's Plan for Canadians* (2008), P. 24.


200 mile exclusive economic zone, they lacked critical defence policy details such as having the military capacity to actually enforce the laws. Campaign '08 reiterated the desire to purchase major equipment, including replacements for frigates, maritime patrols and search and rescue, by investing \$45 to \$50 billion. However, it can only be referred to as a desire considering its allotted time frame, 20 years,²⁵¹ and the subsequent budgets, in which the money was not available.

The only funding provided towards Arctic vessels was in 2009: \$175 million on a cash basis, to purchase 90 new vessels, five new lifeboats and two inshore science vessels for areas other than the Arctic; vessel life extensions for five vessels in non-Arctic locations; and smaller repairs, called vessel refits for 35 vessels, of which five are in the Central and Arctic region. Based on this description, likely a very small percentage of that \$175 million would actually be going to Arctic vessels.

Budget 2010 did not address military defence in the Arctic at all. Issues like acquiring icebreakers, patrol ships, troops for Iqaluit, a deep water port, army training in Cambridge Bay, UAV squadrons, Aurora aircraft and Ranger revitalization had disappeared from the agenda. 2017 had already been promised for the Diefenbaker, one of the three initially promised icebreakers, but that was it. This lack of action is explained in the 2010 budget. "As part of measures to restrain the growth in overall government spending and return to budget balance in the medium term, the Government will slow the rate of previously planned growth in the National Defence budget. Budget 2010 reduces growth in National Defence's budget by \$525 million in 2012–13 and \$1 billion annually beginning in 2013–14. Defence spending will

²⁵¹ Conservative Party of Canada Campaign, *The True North Strong and Free: Stephen Harper's Plan for Canadians* (2008), p. 29.

continue to grow but more slowly than previously planned.”²⁵² This is subsequently evidenced visually using Chart 4.1.2.²⁵³



The budget explains that the government is confident its long-term objectives from the Canada First Defence Strategy, defending Canada, defending North America and contributing to international peace and security, remain achievable. As the graph clearly demonstrates, however, the moderate increase of \$2 billion in defence spending between 2005 and 2007 is not maintained to 2009, where the increase is only \$1 billion, and the projected increase for 2011 is only slightly better at \$1.5 billion. This drops back further to an increase of only \$1 billion by 2013, as opposed to the pre-budget value of a \$2 billion increase. Considering that the strength

²⁵² Government of Canada (2010), *Budget/Chapter 4/ Restraining Growth in National Defence Spending* Retrieved March 11, 2010 from <http://www.budget.gc.ca/2010/plan/chap4a-eng.html#a6>.

²⁵³ Government of Canada (2010), *Budget/Chapter 4/ Restraining Growth in National Defence Spending/chart 4 1 2* Retrieved March 11, 2010 from <http://www.budget.gc.ca/2010/plan/chap4a-eng.html#a6>.

of the graph's projection is very much based on future promises, when the Conservative government may or may not even be in power, and that O'Connor's initial Arctic sovereignty strategy was based on the defence budget increasing by \$1 billion increments annually, this was a distinct shift in direction for the Conservative government.

TRANSITIONING THE NORTHERN SOVEREIGNTY STRATEGY UNDER DEFENCE MINISTER MACKAY

Since public expectations for quantifiable proof of a government's successful implementation of campaign promises expand in fairly equal proportion to a government's number of years in power, the 2008 election platform and the subsequent budgets of 2009 and 2010 needed an empowering, distinct northern sovereignty strategy that didn't require \$20 billion. The implementation of social and economic policies in the north had begun over the last couple of years and showed some potential to support both northern sovereignty and public opinion, but at less cost. Considering the changes in available finances due to the war in Afghanistan and the large scale global recession, utilizing these policies demonstrated an ability to adjust to circumstances, just as Mulroney had done; strengthening his popularity by adapting to the unexpected situation of the Polar Sea problem.

Scientists were forecasting as late as May 2006 that safe summertime navigation of the Northwest Passage would be possible by 2070. By 2007, the date for regular navigation had moved forward to 2050. Towards the end of the year, the figure was cut again, to as early as 2030.²⁵⁴ This dramatic change was solidified by the October 17th delivery of fertilizer to

²⁵⁴ Ken S. Coates et al, *Arctic Front: Defending Canada in the Far North* (Toronto: Thomas Allen Publishers, 2008), p. 146.

Churchill, Manitoba, by the Kapital Sviridov Russian boat via the Northwest Passage.²⁵⁵ The reality was clear: access to the Americas through the Northwest Passage was real; immediate short-term strategies to prove northern sovereignty were needed under the new Minister that could work around budgetary limitations. This was probably not a surprise to the new government considering the 2007 Throne Speech's proposal, to establish a world-class Arctic research station, and become the "hub of scientific activities in the north, gathering knowledge that will support our sovereignty and assist with resource development and environmental protection."²⁵⁶

Budget 2008 offered financial support towards the increasingly critical facet of Canadian sovereignty: \$34 million over the subsequent two years towards carrying out further data collection and legal work to enable Canada to present an effective submission to UNCLOS before the end of 2013, the cut-off date, as part of Canada's comprehensive ocean floor mapping to prove Arctic and Atlantic limits on the continental shelf.²⁵⁷ The consequences to this financing could be as dramatic as whether the waters past the Canadian Archipelago islands would be considered Canadian, allowing Canadian control of who traverses the Northwest Passage commercially, how much they pay for the shortcut, what consequences are imposed should accidents like oil spills occur, and what nations are allowed to have Arctic nautical military vehicles in the region.

Northern economics in platform 2006 had suggested the "single window" approach to federal regulatory bodies in the North for the oil and gas and mining sectors; develop(ing),

²⁵⁵ Ken S. Coates et al, *Arctic Front: Defending Canada in the Far North* (Toronto: Thomas Allen Publishers, 2008), p. 150.

²⁵⁶ Government of Canada (2007), *Prime Minister Stephen Harper addresses the House of Commons in a reply to the Speech from the Throne*. Retrieved March 2010 from <http://news.gc.ca/web/article-eng.do?crtr.sj1D=&mthd=advSrch&crtr.mnthndVI=3&nid=355519&crtr.dpt1D=&crtr.tp1D=&crtr.lc1D=&crtr.yrStrtVI=2007&crtr.kw=research%2Band%2Bstation&crtr.dyStrtVI=26&crtr.aud1D=&crtr.mnthStrtVI=1&crtr.yrndVI=2008&crtr.dyndVI=9>.

²⁵⁷ Government of Canada (2008), *Budget Chapter 4/Improving Geological Mapping for Resource Development*. Retrieved March 10, 2010 from <http://www.budget.gc.ca/2008/plan/chap4a-eng.html#geological>.

together with northerners, both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal, a northern vision to guide economic, social, and environmental progress in the region; the two hundred mile continental shelf limit; wild fish stock management; and elimination of bans on seal products. By budget 2008, motivators to encourage such ideas included policies like the extension of the Mineral Exploration Tax Credit. This was to persuade people to invest in flow-through shares to finance mining exploration and support the Territorial economies. It would help companies raise capital to explore mineral resources for an additional year, until March 31st, 2009, at a cost of \$120 million.²⁵⁸ Another important northern resource, fisheries, was also tackled: Budget 2008 provided \$8 million over two years for the construction, operation and management of a commercial harbour in Pangnirtung, Nunavut, to support local infrastructure and help develop the fishery industry further.²⁵⁹ Besides offering economic opportunities, policies like this were simultaneously introducing a social aspect to northern sovereignty, showing Conservative concern, representative of a nation's concern, for northern residents whose quality of life was severely limited by the territories' weak economies and low standard of living. To improve the quality of life for northern residents, budget 2008 offered an increase to the Northern Residents' Deduction. This would provide an increase to the maximum daily residency deduction for those in the intermediate and northern zones, to help draw skilled labour up to the territories.²⁶⁰ Another socio-economic territorial advance was the \$200 million provided to Northern Housing over two years to improve the quality of territorial residencies.²⁶¹ As part of increasing Canada's northern footprint through demonstrating environmental stewardship, budget 2008 allotted \$62

²⁵⁸ Government of Canada (2009), *Budget Chapter 3/Helping All Regions Prosper*. Retrieved March 10, 2010 from <http://www.budget.gc.ca/2009/plan/bpc3e-eng.html#38>.

²⁵⁹ Government of Canada (2008), *Budget Chapter 4/Supporting Fisheries in the North*. Retrieved March 10, 2010 from <http://www.budget.gc.ca/2008/plan/chap4a-eng.html#sovereignty>.

²⁶⁰ Government of Canada (2008), *Budget Annex 4/Northern Residents Deduction*. Retrieved March 10, 2010 from <http://www.budget.gc.ca/2008/plan/ann4a-eng.html#residents>.

²⁶¹ Government of Canada (2009), *Budget/Chapter 3/Northern Housing*. Retrieved March 10, 2010 from <http://www.budget.gc.ca/2009/plan/bpc3c-eng.html#9>.

million over the next five years to advance ocean health, and improve surveillance and enforcement along the coasts, including the Arctic, and offered \$15 million over the next two years to create and expand protected areas in the Northwest Territories.

The 2009 budget supported development of a world-class High Arctic research station. This was not a new idea; however it would have some new specifications: In his interview for this thesis, Dr. Bruce Carson, who was one of the writers for the Campaign 2004 and 2006 platforms and helped prepare Steven Harper for the 2004 debates, also the main policy advisor in 2006 along with Mark Cameron, explained Harper's long term objective and logic with projects like these that related back to the new direction for northern economic and social stewardship.

I remember a conversation [with Harper] on building another research station up there, and him saying he wasn't going to build another [one] up there to have scientists from Toronto go up there and do studies, then return home while Aboriginals sweep the floor. He wanted them to be able to take advantage of these jobs, and allow facilities to grow.²⁶²

When asked if that is why the research station has not materialized yet, since training northerners to fill highly skilled positions might require further schooling for them to do so, Cameron replied

I don't think it is to get them into the facility in that manner specifically... Together, we are focusing on their education, [which is] a long term proposition. [Since] the station has to be built soon, [the most qualified jobs may not be filled by locals immediately]... There is a lot of thought being given, especially with the new National Chief of the

²⁶² Interview with lawyer Bruce Carson, for thesis, March 22, 2010.

Assembly of First Nations, Shawn Atleo [into how they can best be served vocationally by such a facility].²⁶³

The logic also included \$2 million to undertake a feasibility study for the proposed station, and \$85 million over the next two years to invest in maintaining or upgrading key existing Arctic research facilities.²⁶⁴ Dr. Carson summarized the impact socially on northern residents:

[Northerners] understand that Harper cares about them. They haven't had a Prime Minister like that, in a meaningful way, in a long time. Guys are up there a lot working on these projects. We've got a northern major projects office, northern economics development office and more. Words have been followed with actions.²⁶⁵

This is debatable, from the perspective of Shelagh Grant, author of *Polar Imperative: A History of Arctic Sovereignty in North America*, who states that Canada's Arctic policy today is no different than the former Liberal government, having "blended [the Arctic] with the Subarctic to create only generalized guidelines."²⁶⁶ Grant continues with further criticism from Michael Byers, author of *Who Owns the Arctic? Understanding Sovereignty Disputes in the North*. Regarding the 2009 publication of *Canada's Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future*, "[he points] out there was little in the way of new initiatives and no mention of programs that had been cancelled, such as the Northern Watch pilot project designed to test new surveillance technologies

²⁶³ Interview with lawyer Bruce Carson, for thesis, March 22, 2010.

²⁶⁴ Government of Canada (2009), *Budget/Chapter 3/Supporting Canada's Vision for the North: world-class, High Arctic research station to improve our understanding of the northern environment*. Retrieved March 11, 2010 from <http://www.budget.gc.ca/2009/plan/bpc3d-eng.html#16>.

²⁶⁵ Interview with lawyer Bruce Carson., for thesis, Monday, March 22nd, 2010.

²⁶⁶ Shelagh Grant, *Polar Imperative: A history of Arctic sovereignty in North America* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2010), p. 442.

in the High Arctic.”²⁶⁷ Grant summarizes the last decade, including the Harper years, in the Arctic:

Major investments in infrastructure to protect Arctic sovereignty became victims of partisan politics and/or budget cuts. Plans for a nuclear-powered icebreaker were dropped; plans for a fleet of nuclear submarines were shelved; orders for search and rescue helicopters were cancelled. ... Whether Conservative or Liberal, a newly elected party in power tended to wash the slate clean of its opponents’ plans and promised a new set of its own... Prime Minister Harper made strong political statements to achieve that goal. Some of the items were left over from previous budgets; some were merely promises; some involved feasibility or scientific studies; many related to the Subarctic and had little to do with strengthening Arctic sovereignty. As a result, little “new money” was actually spent on the Arctic.²⁶⁸

A significant focus of Canadian Arctic research, to prove how far the North American continental plate extends into the sea by 2013 for UNCLOS, was pushed into the limelight with Russian haste to prove its own Arctic plate, and consequently prove ownership of ocean floor oil supplies.²⁶⁹ Russia’s scientific proof was submitted to UNCLOS in 2001, and UNCLOS responded by recommending that Russia revise its submission. In 2009, media began following Russia’s “eleventh hour” attempts to justify its claims, including a \$50 million investment in

²⁶⁷ Shelagh Grant, *Polar Imperative: A history of Arctic sovereignty in North America* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2010), p.442.

²⁶⁸ Shelagh Grant, *Polar Imperative: A history of Arctic sovereignty in North America* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2010), p. 433.

²⁶⁹ Randy Boswell. “Canadian Scientists Press Mission to Assert Arctic Rights,” *Montreal Gazette*, May 19, 2009, p. A.10.

February, 2010.²⁷⁰ In the same year, the Conservative government also put forth \$37.6 million towards departments and agencies in support of environmental assessments, regulatory coordination, science, and Aboriginal consultations related to the Mackenzie Gas Project.²⁷¹ Another project was the creation of a new regional economic development agency for the north, to be established with \$50 million over five years.²⁷² \$90 million would be provided over five years to Indian and Northern Affairs for the purpose of renewing the Strategic Investments in Northern Economic Development program, the purpose of which was to broaden the economic cases of all three territories, to strengthen northerners' abilities to take advantage of economic opportunities, and to increase the coordination amongst partners and programs serving northern economic development.²⁷³ \$305 million would be provided over the next two years to improve health outcomes from First Nations Canada-wide, a portion of which was reserved for Inuit.²⁷⁴

Budget 2010 came out in March, and like its 2008 and 2009 predecessors, had no funding to implement the 2006 campaign defence promises. Instead, it allotted \$8 million over two years for Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, fulfilling requirements under land claim agreements with Aboriginal groups. The money would be used to support community-based environmental monitoring and data collection through the Northwest Territories Cumulative Impact Monitoring Program and the Nunavut General Monitoring Program.²⁷⁵ The Canadian High Arctic Research Station's needs were also assessed, and it was given a further \$18 million over five years to

²⁷⁰ Randy Boswell. "Russia puts \$50 M towards Arctic claim: Scientists told to find evidence backing sovereignty argument," *Edmonton Journal*, Feb 6, 2010, p. B.8.

²⁷¹ Government of Canada (2009), *Budget/Chapter 3/Promoting Energy Development in Canada's North*. Retrieved March 11, 2010 from <http://www.budget.gc.ca/2009/plan/bpc3c-eng.html#9>.

²⁷² Government of Canada (2009), *Budget/Chapter 3/Strengthening Economic Development in the North*. Retrieved from <http://www.budget.gc.ca/2009/plan/bpc3c-eng.html#9>.

²⁷³ Government of Canada (2009), *Budget/Chapter 3/Strengthening Economic Development in the North*. Retrieved March 11, 2010 from <http://www.budget.gc.ca/2009/plan/bpc3c-eng.html#9>.

²⁷⁴ Government of Canada (2009), *Budget/Chapter 3/Strengthening Partnerships with Aboriginal Canadians*. Retrieved March 11, 2010 from <http://www.budget.gc.ca/2009/plan/bpc3c-eng.html#9>.

²⁷⁵ Government of Canada (2010), *Budget/Chapter 3.3/Community-Based Environmental Monitoring in the North*. Retrieved March 11, 2010 from <http://www.budget.gc.ca/2010/plan/chap3c-eng.html#a64>.

Indian and Northern Affairs Canada to commence the preconstruction design phase for the station, beyond the promised \$2 million in 2009 for the feasibility study.²⁷⁶

Fears concerning of global warming and its consequences had begun rapidly increasing after Peter MacKay became Minister of Defence. By 2010, these fears were skyrocketing. This brought with it an awareness that maritime traffic would increase as the ice decreased, and budget 2010 committed to the International Maritime Organization to provide meteorological information and navigational data to facilitate the safe management of marine traffic in two well-defined Arctic areas that are substantially within Canadian territory. The areas include Canadian Arctic waters such as the Northwest Passage, and adjacent waters north of Alaska and along part of the western coast of Greenland. Budget 2010 provided \$9.2 million over two years to Environment Canada and \$2.2 million over two years to Fisheries and Oceans Canada to deliver these services.²⁷⁷

CONCLUSION

It seems that over its four years in power, the Conservative government under Stephen Harper pursued the tactics of both Conservative predecessors Diefenbaker and Mulroney. Immediately after election, with a need to invest in the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan, promises concerning a bigger and better Force to defend the north through improvements to northern weaponry, numbers of soldiers available, training centres and other northern domestic promises were put on hold, with the expectation of the hold being temporary. However, with the continuation of Afghanistan and the global financial crisis, including mounting debt and more immediate

²⁷⁶ Government of Canada (2010), *Budget/Chapter 3.3/ Canadian High Arctic Research Station*. Retrieved March 11, 2010 from <http://www.budget.gc.ca/2010/plan/chap3c-eng.html#a64>.

²⁷⁷ Government of Canada (2010), *Budget/Chapter 3.3/ Arctic Meteorological and Navigational Areas*. Retrieved March 11, 2010 from <http://www.budget.gc.ca/2010/plan/chap3c-eng.html#a64>.

priorities, what is still not an immediate problem has to wait. Other tactics, meanwhile, are being used that cost less, like social and economic innovations, to improve both living conditions, and public desire to invest and stimulate northern economies. Harper is definitely striving for his original northern sovereignty goal, but now, due to circumstance, has a weaker capacity to implement initially promised changes.

CONCLUSION: THE POLICIES OF DOMESTIC SPENDING VERSUS THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN POLICY CAMPAIGN PROMISES

It is unlikely if one spoke directly with either Stephen Harper or Peter MacKay that they would openly acknowledge a difference between the initial Conservative Arctic campaign (Gordon O'Connor's Canada First vision) and what has materialized today. Some of the more general campaign goals, like Canada needing to be independently capable of defending national sovereignty and security over vast territory, or the need to increase the Canadian Forces' capacity to protect Canada's Arctic sovereignty and security, can still be argued as policy goals based on the circumstances and realities of the situation today. 2009 witnessed a large recession, stretching Federal spending with the need for stimulus packages that were not previously planned for. Considering that this Government's very existence was based on uniting three sisters, of whom one had a mission towards, as quoted in Chapter Two, "openly advocating smaller government, free markets, traditional values and equality before the law," such financial actions as stimulus packages placed a strain on implementing non-critical plans like increasing northern sovereignty through expensive weaponry and soldiers. In conjunction with this, as discussed previously, within the Department of Defence there was a strong need to spend any monies that were received on recruiting soldiers for Afghanistan, where people were dying and the need was immediate.

If there had been an endless supply of money, or if Canada was not obligated to remain in Afghanistan for whatever reasons are currently causing it to do so, it is probable that more of campaign 2006's Arctic sovereignty defence promises would have been carried out: subsidizing icebreakers; troops for Iqualuit; a deep water port; a sensor system; a training centre for Cambridge Bay with 100 regular personnel; training for new equipment; UAV

squadrons; Aurora aircraft; satellite system upgrades; and an emergency response airborne battalion and Ranger revitalization. When promises are infinite, such as in election campaigns, defending a barren wasteland in the name of sovereignty or stewardship to help brand a party is an excellent vision. Unfortunately, when resources are limited, as history has proven, such defence policies are the first thing to be axed. General Hillier takes it one step further, to say:

It became obvious this [Arctic sovereignty] wasn't a strategy. All it was [composed of] was [a few] pieces of one leg of a potential strategy, [of which] some had not been clearly walked through and were redundant. [They] were overlapping with other capabilities, such as what the coast guard might have. Therefore, we'd spend hundreds of millions and billions on something that hadn't been walked through with the necessary vigour and discipline. It wouldn't have made one bit of difference [if Afghanistan hadn't occurred]. The list of stuff to be done by the military in the arctic wouldn't have happened.

As explored in Chapter III, replacing financially unachievable military campaign promises with social and economic northern stewardship acts such as funding research into northern resources; funding improvements to living conditions; improving infrastructure; and attracting skilled labour, has definitely transpired. Such policies do not require the enormous scale of financial resources as defence policies do, which need military personnel who may also be better used elsewhere. They provide concrete long term support to strengthen the northern economy, which in turn can sustain budgets, rather than detract from them. Unlike General Hillier's feeling that Arctic sovereignty never was a strategy and that it hadn't been clearly thought through from the beginning, Bruce Carson explained in his interview that he

felt, due to the predominantly domestic implementation of Arctic sovereignty policies, that the northern sovereignty goals promised in campaign 2006 can be and are being implemented today. “I think we are well on our way. I think through announcements such as extending the 200 mile limit of the sea, the prime minister spending so much time up north, and others, we’ve gone an awful long way to establishing the north as a really vital part of Canada.”²⁷⁸ He continues by discussing changes in the three territories under the Harper government that are impacting the nation as a whole:

Issues in Yukon are now [about] becoming as much a province as possible.

Devolution issues in the Northwest Territories are still there, but the 2009 budget rollout has helped with infrastructure a lot. [They are] tickled pink with the funds they now have to work with [regarding] issues of developing [their] resources. These are really hard issues that they are working to fix with the Federal Government.

Nunavut is different with the expanse of land and few people, but they have a strategic plan to get off diesel by 2020 and get into renewable resources. The north is alive and well, and really moving!²⁷⁹

When asked if he sees all these results as stemming from the initial 2006 goals, to increase northern sovereignty, initially via a military foreign policy and subsequently through domestic economic and social policies, Carson’s answer was clear:

²⁷⁸ Bruce Carson interview, March 22nd, 2010.

²⁷⁹ Bruce Carson interview, March 22nd, 2010.

Yes. They (northerners) understand that Harper cares for them. They haven't had a prime minister like that in a meaningful way in a long time. [Many people] are up there a lot working on these projects. We've got a northern major projects office, a northern economic development office and so on. Words have been followed up with actions. Initial defence promises have collapsed, but they have meshed together with social and economic actions and show the importance of the north to our government. We have delivered a lot, much more than anyone else. The people [northerners] realize they are on the radar screen. It is very different than prior to 2006.²⁸⁰

The promise on which the campaign of 2006 was initially built, which aimed to unite the three sisters, grew from the 2004 Conservative campaign's goal to prevent further degeneration of Canadian military forces as had been experienced under the previous Liberal government. As Harper stated December 22nd 2005 in Winnipeg,

You don't defend national sovereignty with flags, cheap election rhetoric and advertising campaigns. You need forces on the ground, ships in the sea and proper surveillance. As prime minister I will make it plain to foreign governments, including the government of the United States, that naval vessels travelling in Canadian waters will require the consent of the government of Canada.

²⁸⁰ Bruce Carson interview, March 22nd, 2010.

Implementing this promise is complex, time-consuming, expensive, dependent on economic stability, and requires several steps. The first step would be to prove that the waters are necessarily Canadian. Under Harper, this was being done both through implementation of the UNCLOS 200 mile ocean limit, and also through proving where exactly is the end of the North American continental plate. If the Canadian Archipelago is proven to be just that, Canadian, and is accepted by the UN, ideally the US would automatically seek Canadian permission before entering. However, as Harper realized in 2006, hoping that permission is sought by the US, or any other nation, prior to entry into Canadian waters, in particular those that cover areas of substantial resources such as oil and gas, does not constitute Canadian sovereignty. For this, vessels and soldiers are needed to enforce obedience. These are not in existence yet, but as long-term projects, may blossom as the economy stabilizes. As northern ocean transit increases with the temperature, Afghanistan may lose precedence as the military's dominant financial expense, in particular, if the Canadian/American disagreement over ownership of the Arctic Archipelago expands.

As a result of the 2006 Conservative campaign foreign policy to increase Arctic sovereignty, the Conservative Party has achieved a stronger affiliation with northern residents through regular visits by the Prime Minister to the north and initiated new social and economic policies to improve living conditions. These displays of Canadian stewardship of the northern territory are doing as promised in campaign 2006, increasing Canadian sovereignty. Expanding lucrative northern industries and making sure some of those generated funds stay in the regions of extraction to improve living conditions and infrastructure means Canada's international claims to northern lands continue to be strengthened.

Using foreign policy in the 2006 Conservative Campaign as a new way to invigorate public support by defining domestic political identity could be labeled a moderate success, as measured by the Conservative Party's win of a minority government. However, as shown in Chapter III, the government's inability to implement these promises to the degree promised in 2006's campaign was reflected in the 2008 election's Conservative win of only another minority. Using foreign policy to empower domestic policy is powerful, but is also risky, as this thesis demonstrates. As the Conservative Party learned via the global recession, the costs of troops for a war such as Afghanistan, and concerns regarding future relations such as with the United States over Canadian Arctic waters, the rest of the world's actions cannot be predicted, monitored, controlled or even affected with the same degree of precision as the nation over which the Canadian government presides. Come another election, voters may remember the Conservative Party's proud promises in 2006 of international grandeur through Arctic sovereignty, promises that were given another term to be realized in 2008, and have since faded further into oblivion.

Envisioning foreign policy via Arctic sovereignty as a powerful mechanism to advance Canada's domestic policy objectives by defining a party in an election must be carefully weighed against the likelihood of actually being a mechanism to cause voter support to recede in subsequent elections due to increasing disappointment at the realities of Canadian government impotence on the international scene.

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